The EU model of competition law enforcement has been criticized by many authors ever since antitrust provisions in the EEC Treaty became effective. The fundamental contradiction between the high level of fines threatened (and often imposed) for antitrust violations and the administrative, inquisitorial procedure for investigating antitrust offences and imposing sanctions has principally inspired the critics. The compatibility of the EU model with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) was disputed, instigating the EU institutions to take steps to improve the institutional and procedural framework for applying competition rules. This process has not been completed yet. Directive 2019/1 raised additional controversies regarding the compliance of variegated national enforcement models with the rule of law. This article aims to analyze the genesis of the competition enforcement model in the EU, which materialized mainly through the EU secondary legislation and ECJ case law. We evaluate the EU model against the enforcement system imagined by the Ordoliberal school of thought and, secondly, against administrative models existing in two "old" Member States, in which the rule of law has deeply rooted - France and Germany. We conclude by identifying the most cumbersome deficiencies of the EU model and proposing possible solutions for eliminating them.

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Čikaška škola ekonomske misli ima najveće zasluge za analizu efekata vertikalnih sporazuma na konkurenciju. Ukazujući na činjenicu da ograničenja konkurencije u vertikalnim sporazumima omogućuju proizvođaču da ponudi kupcima kvalitetniji proizovod i dodatne usluge pre, tokom i nakon prodaje, predstavnici Čikaške škole zalagali su se za ukidanje apsolutne zabrane vertikalnih ograničenja u antimonopolskompravu SAD. Prihvatajući njihovo stanovište, Vrhovni sud SAD je to i učinio u odlukama GTE Sylvania i Leegin. Empirijska istraživanja sprovedena poslednjih decenija 20. veka u SAD pokazala su da ne mogu sva vertikalna ograničenja imati jednak tretman u pravu konkurencije. Utvrđivanje prodajne cene u vertikalnim sporazumima može biti opravdano samo u malom broju slučajeva, jer se željeni ekonomski efekti mogu postići i ugovaranjem manje teških ograničenja. Pripadnici Post-čikaške škole potvrdili su stav da je potrebno analizirati konkurenciju na svakom tržištu u okviru jednog lanca proizvodnje i prodaje, kako bi se odmerili efekti ugovorenih vertikalnih ograničenja. Navedeno važi i kada je reč o tržištima posletprodajnih usluga (aftermarkets). Vrhovni sud SAD u slučaju Kodak izdvojio je tri faktora koji kumulativno doprinose jačanju tržišne pozicije proizvođača na tržištu posleprodajnih usluga. Ključne reči: vertikalni sporazumi, ograničenja konkurencije, utvrđivanje prodajne cene, posleprodajne usluge.

The administrative model of competition law enforcement is the prevailing model in the EU Member States. Although Member States are free to choose between the administrative and the judicial model or their combination, many of them opted for the administrative model taking the EU model as an example. The same is valid for the candidate and potential candidate states of Western Balkans. The new Directive 2019/1 deals with the issue of safeguarding the fundamental rights in competition proceedings in general terms only, while stabilisation and association agreements lay down the rule of law as a fundamental principle, but do not say much regarding the features of the competition enforcement model. Candidate countries did not consider the rule of law requirements when designing their competition enforcement models. Competition authorities combine investigative and decision-making powers, preventing them from impartial decision-making. Rules on the appointment, that is, election of members of decision-making bodies, and the limited term of office, made competition authorities susceptible to political influence. Administrative courts are in charge of disputes initiated against decisions of competition authorities in the second instance. Limitations on applying full jurisdiction proceedings, and the modest expertise of administrative law judges in competition law, prevent courts from dealing with the merits of competition cases. Hence, effective judicial control of decisions of competition authorities is missing. The European Commission should monitor the observance of fundamental legal principles in competition law enforcement when assessing the readiness of candidate states to join the EU.