Drawing on sociocultural theories and Bayesian accounts of brain function, in this article we construe psychiatric conditions as disorders of social interaction to fully account for their complexity and dynamicity across levels of description and temporal scales. After an introduction of the theoretical underpinnings of our integrative approach, we take autism spectrum conditions (ASC) as a paradigm example and discuss how neurocognitive hypotheses can be translated into a Bayesian formulation, i.e., in terms of predictive processing and active inference. We then argue that consideration of individuals (even within a Bayesian framework) will not be enough for a comprehensive understanding of psychiatric conditions and consequently put forward the dialectical misattunement hypothesis, which views psychopathology not merely as disordered function within single brains but also as a dynamic interpersonal mismatch that encompasses various levels of description. Moving from a mere comparison of groups, i.e., “healthy” persons versus “patients,” to a fine-grained analysis of social interactions within dyads and groups of individuals will open new avenues and may allow to avoid an overly neurocentric scope in psychiatric research as well as help to reduce social exclusion.

In this article, moving from being to becoming, we construe the 'self' as a dynamic process rather than as a static entity. To this end we draw on dialectics and Bayesian accounts of cognition. The former allows us to holistically consider the 'self' as the interplay between internalization and externalization and the latter to operationalize our suggestion formally. Internalization is considered here as the co-construction of bodily hierarchical models of the (social) world and the organism, while externalization is taken as the collective transformation of the world. We do not consider these processes as sequentially linked, but rather as a dialectic between the collective and the individual. This leads us to the suggestion of the self as a historical product of dialectical attunement across multiple time scales, from species evolution and culture to individual development and everyday learning. Subsequently, we describe concrete means for empirically testing our proposal in the form of two-person psychophysiology and multi-level analyses of intersubjectivity. Taken together, we suggest that a finegrained analysis of social interaction might allow us to reconsider the 'self' beyond the static individual, i.e. how it emerges and manifests itself in social relations. Such an approach, we believe, could be relevant in multiple fields, from ethics and psychiatry to pedagogy and artificial intelligence.

In healthy individuals the anterior cingulate gyrus signals social prediction errors: discrepancies between an actual outcome and the perceived expectations of another person. Balsters et al. demonstrate that this crucial social signal is altered in individuals with autism, and that variability in social prediction error signalling indexes social symptom severity.

Autism is a developmental condition, characterized by difficulties of social interaction and communication, as well as restricted interests and repetitive behaviors. Although several important conceptions have shed light on specific facets, there is still no consensus about a universal yet specific theory in terms of its underlying mechanisms. While some theories have exclusively focused on sensory aspects, others have emphasized social difficulties. However, sensory and social processes in autism might be interconnected to a higher degree than what has been traditionally thought. We propose that a mismatch in sensory abilities across individuals can lead to difficulties on a social, i.e. interpersonal level and vice versa. In this article, we, therefore, selectively review evidence indicating an interrelationship between perceptual and social difficulties in autism. Additionally, we link this body of research with studies, which investigate the mechanisms of action control in social contexts. By doing so, we highlight that autistic traits are also crucially related to differences in integration, anticipation and automatic responding to social cues, rather than a mere inability to register and learn from social cues. Importantly, such differences may only manifest themselves in sufficiently complex situations, such as real-life social interactions, where such processes are inextricably linked.