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Emigration of skilled and able from Russia markedly increased in mid-2010s, thus pushing multiple Russian scholars to reassess the phenomenon, its definition, scope, consequences, and causes. This article found that the nexus between brain drain and internationalization of education plays an important role in the debate. By means of analysis of the texts of scholarly articles in Russian academic journals and of the transcripts of interviews with Russian educators directly involved in internationalization of education, this study found that despite most representatives of Russian academic community perceive emigration as a concern for the nation, they simultaneously view it as a perfect choice for an individual, who is skilled and able. The ambivalent perception of brain drain creates the situation, when some Russian academics justify their resistance to internationalization with assumption that it causes brain drain, whereas some others by word and deed support internationalization as a means to curb emigration. In the context of controversial educational reforms underway in Russia since 1990s, such perception helped internationalization survive as a target of the reforms, despite their overall course reversed in 2010s compared with 1990s.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland has commissioned this assessment of the effects of possible NATO membership, in connection with the preparation of the Government's Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy. This is the first assessment of its kind conducted at the request of the Finnish government since 2007: during the intervening decade, major strategic changes have occurred at the global, European and regional levels. We were not entrusted with voicing a preference for or against NATO membership. Nor were we requested to provide a pro-and-con balance-sheet type approach. Our task has been to provide an evaluation of the potential effects of membership, in the most clinical manner possible. This does not mean that all effects of membership would be equally straightforward: some, such as the treaty commitments integral to Atlantic Alliance membership, or the direct impact of belonging to NATO's command structure are comparatively easy to describe. Others, such as the possible reactions of Russia to Finland's entry into NATO or the consequences of possible Finnish membership for the corresponding debate in Sweden are necessarily more probabilistic in nature. The text of the assessment reflects these differences in the degrees of certainty. We have adhered to a strict interpretation of our mandate, with one substantive exception. In our work it became immediately apparent that the choices made by Finland and Sweden (or vice versa) to join or not to join NATO, separately or together, could lead to different effects for the security and defence of Finland. Thus, we have decided on our own initiative to extend our analysis to include a hypothesis whereby Sweden would join NATO but Finland would not, since this would change the regional strategic and military status quo for Finland.

Although the Cold War ended thirty years ago, the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line, which characterized Finland’s foreign and domestic politics in the Cold War era, remains an essential element of various competing discourses in the country. This article is based on a study of the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line” concept as a fl oating signifi er frequently used in competing Finnish discourses, including those on the Finnish–Russian relations, on the Finnish foreign policy strategy, and on Finnish domestic politics. The discourse on the relations with Russia involves the proponents of continuing with the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line aiming at transforming Russia’s geographical proximity into an opportunity for Finland, and those who oppose this line on the grounds that in the Cold War era it resulted in a shameful “Finlandization” of the country. The Finnish discourse on the country’s foreign policy strategy involves those who argue in favor of continuing with the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line, of which the core was neutrality in the Cold War era and is non-alignment today, and those in favor of giving up with non-alignment to choose the NATO option. The article discovers that Sweden plays a critical role in this discourse than Russia. Finally, the Finnish discourse on the country’s domestic politics involves those in favor of continuing with the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line, of which the core is consensual politics, and those who support the transition to more transparent, albeit inevitably partisan politics.

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