Age data frequently display excess frequencies at round or attractive ages, such as even numbers and multiples of five. This phenomenon of age heaping has been viewed as a problem in previous research, especially in demography and epidemiology. We see it as an opportunity and propose its use as a measure of human capital that can yield comparable estimates across a wide range of historical contexts. A simulation study yields methodological guidelines for measuring and interpreting differences in age heaping, while analysis of contemporary and historical datasets demonstrates the existence of a robust correlation between age heaping and literacy at both the individual and aggregate level. To illustrate the method, we generate estimates of human capital in Europe over the very long run, which support the hypothesis of a major increase in human capital preceding the industrial revolution.

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We explore pre-and early industrial inequality of numeracy using the age heaping method and anthropometric strategies. For France, we map differential numeracy between the upper and lower segments of a sample population for 26 regions during the seventeenth century. For the US, inequality of numeracy is estimated for 25 states during the 19th century. Testing the hypothesis of a negative impact of inequality on welfare growth, we find evidence that lower inequality increased industrial development in the US, whereas for France such an effect was only evident in interactions with political variables such as proximity to central government.I t is very difficult to measure inequalities before and during the industrial revolution. This study measures human capital inequality by employing a set of methods that developed around the phenomenon of age heaping, i.e. the tendency of poorly educated people to round their age erroneously. 2 For example, they answer more often '40', if they are in fact 39 or 41, compared with better educated people. In a related study, we found that the relationship between illiteracy and age heaping for less developed countries (LDCs) after 1950 is relatively close. 3 The age heaping and illiteracy for not fewer than 270,000 individuals who were organized by 416 regions, ranging from Latin America to Oceania, produced a correlation coefficient of 0.63. 4 A number of other studies supported a close correlation between age heaping and other human capital measures for earlier periods. Data from the US census manuscripts showed a very consistent and robust relationship, 1 We are indebted to

Using census-based data on the ability to recall one's age, we show that low levels of nutrition impaired numeracy in industrializing England, 1780 to 1850: cognitive ability declined among those born during the Napoleonic wars. The effect was stronger in areas where grain was expensive and relief for the poor, an early form of welfare support was limited. Nutritional shortages had a nonlinear effect on numeracy, with, severe shortages impairing numeracy more. Nutrition during childhood also mattered for labor market outcomes: individuals born in periods or counties with low numeracy typically worked in occupations with lower earnings. NUMERACY AND THE IMPACT OF HIGH FOOD PRICES IN INDUSTRIALIZING BRITAIN, 1780-1850Jörg Baten, Dorothee Crayen, and Hans-Joachim Voth* Abstract-Using census-based data on the ability to recall one's age, we show that low levels of nutrition impaired numeracy in industrializing England, 1780 to 1850: cognitive ability declined among those born during the Napoleonic wars. The effect was stronger in areas where grain was expensive and relief for the poor, an early form of welfare support was limited. Nutritional shortages had a nonlinear effect on numeracy, with, severe shortages impairing numeracy more. Nutrition during childhood also mattered for labor market outcomes: individuals born in periods or counties with low numeracy typically worked in occupations with lower earnings.

Die Europäer genießen ohne Zweifel einen sehr viel höheren Lebensstandard als die Bewohner anderer Erdteile, wie z.B. Afrika oder Asien. Als wichtigste Gründe gelten beim derzeitigen Stand der Forschung vor allem institutionelle Entwicklungen zwischen Mittelalter und der Zeit um 1800. Die frühe Entwicklung einklagbarer Verträge, der Buchführung oder die Schaffung von Börsen führten in Europa und der europäisch besiedelten Neuen Welt zu einem Entwicklungsvorteil gegenüber anderen Weltregionen, der im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert eher noch verstärkt wurde. Die frühen institutionellen Verbesserangen zogen möglicherweise technologische Vorteile nach sich, wie einige Studien argumentieren. 1 Auch der Bildungsrevolution, die in Europa früher als in anderen Teilen der Welt stattfand, wird teilweise eine große Bedeutung zugesprochen. 2 Allerdings gibt es ebenso konträre Studien, die die relative Wirkungskraft vor Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts eher gering einschätzen; 3 sogar für das 20. Jahrhundert. 4 Der Grund für die bisher unklare Einschätzung der Bildung als Wachstumsmotor sui generis vor dem späten 19. Jahrhundert ist zweifellos in der mageren und uneinheitlichen Datenlage begründet. Zwar führte das große Interesse an derartigen Daten dazu, dass für England, Spanien und Frankreich einige Studien zur Unterschriftenfahigkeit vorliegen. 5 Aber zum einen ist nicht völlig geklärt, wie sehr die Unterschrift unter einem Heiratseintrag oder bei anderer Gelegenheit bereits allgemeinere Schreibfähigkeit reflektiert. 6 Zum zweiten ist die soziale Selektion oft nicht eindeutig, beispielsweise bei den spanischen Daten, die teilweise den Prozessakten der Inquisition entstammen. So wurden in einem wichtigen Fundus zur Stadt Cuenca in Spanien überproportional viele portugiesische "Marranes" (vormalige