We examine contemporaneous jumps (cojumps) among individual stocks and a proxy for the market portfolio. We show, through a Monte Carlo study, that using intraday jump tests and a coexceedance criterion to detect cojumps has a power similar to the cojump test proposed by Bollerslev et al. (2008). However, we also show that we should not expect to detect all common jumps comprising a cojump when using such coexceedance based detection methods. Empirically, we provide evidence of an association between jumps in the market portfolio and cojumps in the underlying stocks. Consistent with our Monte Carlo evidence, moderate numbers of stocks are often detected to be involved in these (systematic) cojumps. Importantly, the results suggest that market-level news is able to generate simultaneous large jumps in individual stocks. We also find evidence of an association between systematic cojumps and Federal Funds Target Rate announcements.

We examine contemporaneous jumps (cojumps) among individual stocks and a proxy for the market portfolio. We show, through a Monte Carlo study, that using intraday jump tests and a coexceedance criterion to detect cojumps has a power similar to the cojump test proposed by Bollerslev et al. (2008). However, we also show that we should not expect to detect all common jumps comprising a cojump when using such coexceedance based detection methods. Empirically, we provide evidence of an association between jumps in the market portfolio and cojumps in the underlying stocks. Consistent with our Monte Carlo evidence, moderate numbers of stocks are often detected to be involved in these (systematic) cojumps. Importantly, the results suggest that market-level news is able to generate simultaneous large jumps in individual stocks. We also find evidence of an association between systematic cojumps and Federal Funds Target Rate announcements.

Leveraging branch‐level data on bank deposits, we provide evidence of a negative impact of branching restrictions on payout ratios, which occurs only for banks with a low charter value, as proxied by the market‐to‐book ratio. The results for the market‐to‐book ratio extend to the Lerner index, the return on assets, and the Z‐score, suggesting that risk‐shifting incentives drive our results rather than signaling incentives or agency costs. Our results are robust to different proxies for banking competition and identification strategies, and bootstrap simulations suggest that our results are not due to confounding factors.

We relate derivatives usage to the level of corporate governance/monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives and investment decisions of UK firms. We find evidence to suggest that the monitoring environment, e.g., board size, influences the use of both currency and interest rate derivatives usage. Managerial compensation also influences derivatives usage. Investment decisions are affect by the governance and managerial compensation of firms, which in turn impact on derivatives usage. We find a strong tendency for UK firms to reduce derivatives usage in situations where derivatives usage should be increased. There is limited evidence that firms use hedging substitutes to avoid monitoring from external capital markets.

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