Two concepts have polarized the philosophical debates on functions since the 1970s. One is Millikan's concept of ‘proper function’, meant to capture the aetiology of biological organs and artefacts. The other is Cummins's concept of ‘dispositional function’, designed to account for the real work that functional devices perform within a system. In this paper I locate Hegel's concept of biological function in the context of those debates. Admittedly, Hegel's concept is ‘etiological’, since in his account the existence of purposive organs is explained by appeal to their purpose, yet, against Millikan's concept, Hegel's does not presuppose the phenomenon of natural selection nor derives the function of tokens from the function of types. So, my aim is, first, to present Hegel's approach to biological functions as one neither purely etiological nor purely dispositional. It will appear rather as an example of an organizational account (as those advocated today by McLaughlin, Mossio and others), that attributes function according to present performances (unlike etiological accounts) and emphasizes the role of functional parts in their self-production within the system they belong to (unlike dispositional accounts). Finally, I briefly discuss how Hegel's concept performs against common objections to organizational accounts.

Charles Taylor claims that not only Kant, but also successors of Kant such as Fichte and Hegel, advocate a primitive concept of action, namely, a basic, irreducible, indispensable concept allegedly essential to our self-understanding. This paper shows how philosophers like Robert Brandom agree with Taylor explicitly with regard to Hegel, and attribute to him transcendental non-metaphysical arguments in support of such a concept. It then proceeds to challenge this attribution (both of the concept and the type of argument), offering a brief presentation of an alternative non-transcendental metaphysical approach to the Hegelian idea of giving actuality to a concept (or end) through a productive activity.

<p class='p1'>¿Cómo hay que entender la tesis de Hegel en la Lógica de que “la teleología es la verdad del mecanismo”? La afirmó contra Kant, desde luego; a saber, contra la posibilidad de que lo que parece teleológico sea sólo mecánico; pero no en el sentido de un compromiso dogmático con la realidad de fines naturales y tampoco en el de una refutación del mecanicismo como la que Fichte busca con su radicalización de la filosofía trascendental. Aquí se examina qué posibilidades quedan abiertas cuando se cierran aquéllas.</p>

This book addresses a key issue in Hegel's philosophical legacy - his account of purposiveness and teleology - that has often been wrongly criticised and misunderstood. In a re-examination of Hegel's account of purposiveness and teleology, Edgar Maraguat explores its connection with the rest of Hegel's philosophy, traces the influence of Aristotle and Kant on its arguments, and closely analyses its place in Hegel's Science of Logic. The result is a new perspective not only on the nature, spirit and goals of the Logic, but on the whole of Hegel's philosophical legacy, and will appeal to a range of readers in Hegel studies, the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas.

The article explores the putatively non-metaphysical -non-voluntarist, and even non-causal -concept of freedom outlined in Hegel's work and discusses its influential interpretation by Robert Pippin as an 'essentially practical' concept. I argue that Hegel's affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim 'from a practical point of view'.Keywords: German Idealism, Kant, Fichte, Spirit, postulate, teleology, mechanism, naturalism, self-legislation, autonomy, assumption, faith, Science of Logic, Idea, intentional stance, transcendental philosophy, voluntarism, compatibilism, objectivity, action. ResumenEl artículo explora el concepto supuestamente no metafísico -no voluntarista, incluso no causal -de la libertad que se perfila en la obra de Hegel y discute la influyente interpretación que de él hace Robert Pippin como concepto 'esencialmente práctico'. Razono que la afirmación de Hegel de la libertad debe ser distinguida de la de Kant y la de Fichte, pues no está basada en un entendimiento previo de la autoconciencia como relación originalmente teleológica y no tiene la naturaleza de una afirmación 'desde un punto de vista práctico'.