nanotechnology, CSR, CSP, stakeholder engagement, uncertainty, risk, innovation,

New technologies do not always elicit new regulatory responses. More often than not, policymakers deal with new technologies by deferring to existing regulatory regimes. This article argues that there are often overlooked consequences of grafting a new technological area, displaying different types of risks and uncertainties, onto an existing regulatory framework. Not only can it entail the application of ill‐suited rules and standards, but it can also involve the reproduction of deeply ingrained traditions and assumptions which, under the weight of history, makes scrutiny extremely difficult. As is shown here, nanotechnology‐enhanced products inherit a raft of consumer protection rules as well as a regulatory predisposition to internal market facilitation. So entrenched is the focus on market opening that making ad hoc changes to existing regulations to incorporate the broader concerns around nano‐products cannot escape the reach of a very powerful market context.

Although nanotechnologies create new and innovative opportunities in many industrial and technological sectors, they present a number of regulatory challenges. There is evidence to suggest that some nanomaterials may pose risks of harm to health and the environment. The nature of these risks, however, is profoundly uncertain. In the first part of this paper, I show that legislative provisions currently used to regulate nanomaterials are ill-equipped for this purpose. In light of this, I proceed in the second part to examine how risks from nanomaterials ought to be regulated. Using what loosely may be described as a cost-benefit analytical framework, I appraise alternative regulatory options and draw initial conclusions about which is likely to prove the most cost-effective.

This article provides a critique of the UK government's regulatory response to ‘fracking’. It shows how government has adopted two distinct schemas of regulation, which may usefully be classified under the headings ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’. These schemas rely on very different interpretive conventions and are in many ways contradictory. Yet, government uses both ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ arguments simultaneously in order to advance its policy in favour of fracking. The article explains how two seemingly different regulatory approaches work together towards the same policy goal, and highlights the role of law in facilitating technological development.

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