The paper argues the ideas developing the provisions of behavioral economics as a branch of economic theory. The authors substantiate a new method of studying the economic space, called 'the dialogue between the individual and the environment', characterize the causes of deformation in the development of economic relations, taking into account the features of economic space as a certain dynamic structure with peculiar topological properties. The research is focused on the task of identifying the main characteristics of economic space and pointing out those responsible for the development of socially inefficient institutions. The authors develop the concepts of balance and stability as applied to economic space, and work out the spatial approach to the study of economic relations. It is argued that the use of topological model makes it possible to set mathematically correct tasks of dealing with institutional crises as perturbations of the economic space. It is proved by the example of one of the types of organizational cultures, that the method proposed by the authors allows moving from the descriptive character of models to the content one. The proposed approach lets carry out a synthesis of theory and practice and thereby answer the question-why economics and practice are always there, but not together.

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The article engages in a theoretical investigation of the possibility of implementing the Stackelberg strategy within a team. It is assumed that the team gene-rates aggregate income that increases as the efforts invested by each agent intensify, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each agent in a team is to maximize his own individual gain. In order to achieve an outcome that is Paretopreferable over Nash equilibrium, two approaches may be used: identifying a leader or forming a smaller group (coalition) within the team whose members, in pursuance of increased individual gains, choose the route that maximizes coalition gains. It is shown that the advent of a coalition in a team results in Pareto-improvement in a simultaneous game. We analyse the possibility of endogenous leadership forming according to the Stackelberg model when using the mechanism of timing decisions. It is established that under autonomy of all team members, leadership formation can only be confidently predicted in specific individual cases. In a significantly more general case, all of the prerequisites for the formation of leadership are created by the presence of a single coalition interested in implementing the Stackelberg strategy.

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