No abstract

This article examines how two dynamics, one global and one domestic, have interacted to shape the politics of banking in Europe. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, European governments were subject to renewed structural incentive to promote TBTF banks: in financialized economies, the growth of these banks is perceived as an essential element of a national economy's global competitiveness. Yet, this incentive was subject to enhanced political contention at home. Factions—often led by actors from within the state itself—have opposed governments’ impetus to promote TBTF banks. The specific identity, preferences and resources of these factions are determined by distinctive political institutions and vary across countries. Through the comparative analysis of banking structural reform and banking competition policies in the UK, France and Germany, I argue that varieties of regulatory outcomes are explained by the differentiated institutional capacity of “anti-TBTF” factions to carry weight in policymaking processes across jurisdictions.

The current debate about taxing financial transactions is often presented as a brand new one. It is not. At the turn of the 19th century, a similar tax was debated in France and the US Financial actors fought the tax mightily. Those actors were very powerful. Yet, they lost. A tax on stock transfers (STT) was established. Why? Through a comparative analysis of France and the State of New York, this article argues that the tax was adopted because politicians interested in capitalizing on public discontent endeavored to publicize and frame the STT in simple and antagonizing terms. Strong but heterogeneous public hostility against finance got focused on the explicitly politicized issue of the tax. Political salience disrupted the logics of ‘quiet politics’ and momentarily undermined the privileged position of finance. Despite intense lobbying and threats to relocate from financiers, elected officials chose to vote for the STT.

No abstract