Offered here is an interpretation of the ancient Confucian philosopher Mengzi's (372-289 B.C.E. ) method of cultivating moral feelings, which he calls "extension." It is argued that this method is both psychologically plausible and an important, but often overlooked, part of moral life. In this interpretation, extending our moral feelings is not a project in logical consistency, analogical reasoning, or emotional intuition. Rather, Mengzi's method of extension is a project in realigning the human heart that harnesses our rational, reflective, and emotional capacities in order to extend the feelings we already have to the appropriate objects for these feelings. It is argued that there are three main features of Mengzi's account that make it an attractive explanation of the cultivation of moral feelings. The first is the way Mengzi sees reasoning and philosophical reflection as an aid to, rather than the foundation for, moral development. The second is Mengzi's precision regarding the relationship between the basic moral feelings we start with (the "sprouts") and their corresponding virtues. The method of extension acts as a well-designed bridge between feelings and virtues. Third, Mengzi's account, unlike that of the Mohist Yi Zhi, whom he criticizes, pays special attention to the complexities and limitations of human psychology. In conclusion it is shown how a Mengzian understanding of the relationship between feelings and morality can answer some traditional challenges, especially Kantian ones, regarding the proper role of emotion in moral life.

One of the main obstacles to thinking clearly about the morality of anger is that we have two competing intuitions: we think that the effects of anger are often bad, destroying both our relationships and our peace of mind, and that the expression of anger in response to injustice can be good or even required. The tension caused by these competing intuitions has long been noted in Western philosophical works on anger and has led to two distinct approaches to the problem of moral anger, the moderation approach and the elimination approach. Here it is argued that neither approach can fully make sense of the moral contours of anger. A third view on anger is defended, the Tantric view, according to which moral excellence involves a sophisticated facility with complex emotional states. In the presentation of the Tantric view, two tenth-century Buddhist texts are referred to, both by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Dharmaraksita.

This paper addresses the ways that we can understand and transform our strong emotions and how this project contributes to moral and spiritual development. To this end, I choose to think with two Tibetan Buddhist thinkers, both of whom take up the question of how passionate emotions can fit into spiritual and moral life: the famous, playful yogin Shabkar Tsodruk Rangdrol (1781-1851) and the wandering, charismatic master Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887). Shabkar's The Autobiography of Shabkar provides excellent examples of using one's own passionate emotions to connect to others and gain insight into the world. Patrul Rinpoche's The Words of My Perfect Teacher (kun bzang bla ma'i zhal lung) focuses on passionate empathy with the emotions of others. Drawing on these texts, I present a (distinctly Buddhist) conception of a passionate life and argue that passionate emotional experience is a central part of moral and spiritual development more broadly construed.

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In this chapter two Buddhist moral psychological categories are analysed: the brahmavihāras (the four Boundless Qualities), which are the main moral affective states in Buddhist ethics, and the kleśas, or the afflictive mental states. Based on this analysis, two general claims about moral psychology in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist ethics are argued for. First, that Buddhist moral psychology is centrally interested in the psychology of moral improvement: how do I become the kind of person who can respond in the best possible way to the moral needs of myself and others? Second, and related, Buddhist moral psychology focuses on the skills of moral perception and attention. Moral philosophical arguments, it is argued, are generally offered in the context of self-cultivation exercises and not, as they often are in Western ethics, as models of moral deliberation.