Metabolizing Anger: A Tantric Buddhist Solution to the Problem of Moral Anger

Abstract

One of the main obstacles to thinking clearly about the morality of anger is that we have two competing intuitions: we think that the effects of anger are often bad, destroying both our relationships and our peace of mind, and that the expression of anger in response to injustice can be good or even required. The tension caused by these competing intuitions has long been noted in Western philosophical works on anger and has led to two distinct approaches to the problem of moral anger, the moderation approach and the elimination approach. Here it is argued that neither approach can fully make sense of the moral contours of anger. A third view on anger is defended, the Tantric view, according to which moral excellence involves a sophisticated facility with complex emotional states. In the presentation of the Tantric view, two tenth-century Buddhist texts are referred to, both by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Dharmaraksita.

The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation

“…Transition-anger is "forward looking" in the sense that "a reasonable person shifts [from anger] toward more productive forward-looking thoughts, asking what can actually be done to increase either personal or social welfare" (Nussbaum 2016, 6). Nussbaum's notion of transition-anger here resembles Emily McRae's (2015) account of anger which draws on the Tantric Buddhist view that one can "metabolize" anger, that is, transform anger into morally efficacious "nourishment" that avoids destructiveness (McRae 2015, 466, 472). In metabolizing anger, one shifts the energy of the anger away from harm and towards helping oneself or others.…”

Virtuous and Vicious Anger

“…There is no contradiction in offering this advice while at the same time thinking it would be better for everyone if there were no anger at all. See also McRae (2015), who denies that there is morally efficacious anger, but defends a Buddhist view of how anger can be beneficial via a process of transformation. 28 Averill (1982: 236).…”

Raging better: Reflections on the Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage

“…Examples include but are not limited to:Frye (1983),Lorde (1984),Spelman (1989),Jaggar (1996),Campbell (1994),Lugones (1995),Tessman (2005),Bell (2009), MacLachlan (2010),Stockdale (2013),Emerick (2016),Srinivasan (2018),McRae (2019), andHirji (2022). See also, Emerick and Yap (Forthcoming).3 This example is, to my mind, significantly less apt or compelling than the others-which flags an issue with ressentiment rage I will raise later in my discussion.…”