Efficient implementations of concurrent objects such as semaphores, locks, and atomic collections are essential to modern computing. Yet programming such objects is error prone: in minimizing the synchronization overhead between concurrent object invocations, one risks the conformance to reference implementations --- or in formal terms, one risks violating observational refinement. Testing this refinement even within a single execution is intractable, limiting existing approaches to executions with very few object invocations. We develop a polynomial-time (per execution) approximation to refinement checking. The approximation is parameterized by an accuracy k∈N representing the degree to which refinement violations are visible. In principle, more violations are detectable as k increases, and in the limit, all are detectable. Our insight for this approximation arises from foundational properties on the partial orders characterizing the happens-before relations between object invocations: they are interval orders, with a well defined measure of complexity, i.e., their length. Approximating the happens-before relation with a possibly-weaker interval order of bounded length can be efficiently implemented by maintaining a bounded number of integer counters. In practice, we find that refinement violations can be detected with very small values of k , and that our approach scales far beyond existing refinement-checking approaches.

We describe an automatic verification method to check whether transactional memories ensure strict serializability a key property assumed of the transactional interface. Our main contribution is a technique for effectively verifying parameterized systems. The technique merges ideas from parameterized hardware and protocol verification--verification by invisible invariants and symmetry reduction--with ideas from software verification--template-based invariant generation and satisfiability checking for quantified formulæ (modulo theories). The combination enables us to precisely model and analyze unbounded systems while taming state explosion. Our technique enables automated proofs that two-phase locking (TPL), dynamic software transactional memory (DSTM), and transactional locking II (TL2) systems ensure strict serializability. The verification is challenging since the systems are unbounded in several dimensions: the number and length of concurrently executing transactions, and the size of the shared memory they access, have no finite limit. In contrast, state-of-the-art software model checking tools such as BLAST and TVLA are unable to validate either system, due to inherent expressiveness limitations or state explosion.

Efficient implementations of concurrent objects such as semaphores, locks, and atomic collections are essential to modern computing. Programming such objects is error prone: in minimizing the synchronization overhead between concurrent object invocations, one risks the conformance to reference implementations — or in formal terms, one risks violating observational refinement. Precisely testing this refinement even within a single execution is intractable, limiting existing approaches to executions with very few object invocations. We develop scalable and effective algorithms for detecting refinement violations. Our algorithms are founded on incremental, symbolic reasoning, and exploit foundational insights into the refinement-checking problem. Our approach is sound, in that we detect only actual violations, and scales far beyond existing violation-detection algorithms. Empirically, we find that our approach is practically complete, in that we detect the violations arising in actual executions.