In this study, we investigate the financial reporting behavior of chief financial officers (CFOs) with significant prior audit experience. Our tests indicate that, on average, CFOs who were former audit managers or partners report less aggressively than CFOs without prior audit experience. Thus, the mindset that auditors develop during their time in public accounting – which should value objective, transparent, and conservative financial reporting – appears to persist when auditors take high-level positions in industry. However, we also find that the reporting behavior of prior-auditor CFOs becomes more aggressive over time as the salience of their audit experience decays. Further, we find that audit fees are lower for clients with prior-auditor CFOs but increase as the CFOs’ time away from auditing increases. Overall, our study offers important insights regarding how audit experience is associated with the financial reporting behavior of CFOs.

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We investigate labor market consequences for CFOs employed by fraud firms, focusing on reputational contagion for those who are not implicated. These individuals provide an opportunity to understand reputational contagion and the nuanced meaning of “guilt” because the labor market may suspect complicity or infer negligence regardless of whether that is truly the case. We compare these CFOs to a matched sample of non‐fraud CFOs and track both turnover and subsequent employment positions. Non‐implicated CFOs are more likely to experience turnover compared to non‐fraud CFOs, driven in particular by the public revelation of fraud to the labor market. We further find that non‐implicated CFOs are more likely to obtain comparable subsequent employment than non‐fraud CFOs before the fraud is publicly revealed, but not after. In supplementary analyses, we find that turnover rates are highest for non‐implicated CFOs who started their employment with the firm before the fraud began as compared to non‐implicated CFOs who started their employment after the fraud began. These results highlight the labor market significance of the public revelation of fraud and imply that the labor market does not fully distinguish between fraud firm association and general firm performance when making executive hiring decisions.