The external borders of the European Union (EU) are becoming increasingly difficult to delineate as it exports policies to states beyond its own membership. While the EU possesses a clearly defined membership, its borders are `fuzzy'. The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of these `fuzzy' borders on the EU's neighbours - and its resulting `fuzzy' politics. Two case studies are considered: the Baltic States and the Mediterranean. In each, the authors seek to assess the impact of EU relations with these two regions. Four tentative conclusions are drawn. First, the EU is indeed surrounded by regions that can be regarded as intermediate spaces between the inside and outside of the Union, and these regions have indeed become the targets of significant `policy-export'. Over time, the EU has developed substantial interests and significant influence in what can be called the `near abroad'. Second, the EU does not possess a coherent policy of dealing with this `near abroad'. An uneasy mix of initiatives often contradicts the stated goal of region-to-region relations. Third, EU relations with the two regions actually appear to serve rather opposing functions - simultaneously facilitating enlargement and non-enlargement. Finally, the regional impact of EU policies varies considerably as a consequence of the different geo-political and institutional context in the two regions.

Article (Published Version) http://sro.sussex.ac.uk Petito, Fabio and Mavelli, Luca (2012) The postsecular in international relations: an overview. Review of International Studies, 28 (5). pp. 931-942. ISSN 0260-2105 This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/43277/ This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version. Copyright and reuse:Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available.Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.

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In this article I want to put forward an intellectual defence of the political discourse of dialogue of civilisations by challenging the idea that 'civilisation-based thinking' is necessarily a conflict-generating factor and arguing that, contrary to fashionable assumptions, a civilisational dialogue that wants to contribute to a more peaceful world order requires, in a qualified way, 'stronger' civilisational identities. In particular, I take issue with the academic criticisms to dialogue of civilisations coming from the camp of the critique of the clash of civilisations and well represented by Amartya Sen's explicit and Edward Said's more indirect critiques to 'civilisation-based thinking': by unveiling their implicit endorsement of the Westphalian/secularist presumption, I will show the counter-intuitive political implications of a dialogue among 'strong' civilisational identities and traditions when framed hermeneutically as 'fusion of horizons'. Finally I provide a supplementary brief illustration to my defence of dialogue of civilisations by criticising Said's reading of Louis Massignon -the great 20th century French scholar of Islam -as part of Orientalism and suggesting that 'in diverging agreement' with Said, Massignon's work and life stand as a very concrete proof of the possibility of a 'dialogue of civilisations' that escapes the yoke of the Orientalist accusations.

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