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In this paper, I reflect on whether the new Zimbabwe government under the presidency of Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa has the capacity to arrest the developmental challenges facing the country in order to bring about inclusive development which will see the needs of the marginalized or excluded groups such as the poor, women, children, the elderly and people living with disabilities being addressed. I argue that two of the biggest problems bedeviling Zimbabwe today are chronic poverty and disease, which are a legacy of the Zimbabwe government led by ousted former President Robert Gabriel Mugabe. I contend that Mugabe’s government failed to manage its politics, which, in turn, resulted in the decline of Zimbabwe’s economy in the last two decades leading to high unemployment, hyperinflation, brain drain, cash crisis and the outbreak of diseases among a host of problems. My claim is that the effects of the problems listed above are still being felt today. I submit that although the philosophy of hunhu/ubuntu became endangered during Mugabe’s reign, it can still be deployed in the new dispensation to bring about inclusive development by coming up with policies that will attract investors through improving relations with the developed world as well as dealing with the problem of corruption. Keywords: Governance, Development, Inclusive Development, Marginalization, Hunhu/Ubuntu.

In this article, I contend that philosophical reactions against ethno-philosophy, especially the arguments by professional African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji and Kwame Anthony Appiah, cannot go unchallenged at a time when Africa is facing a myriad of problems such as disease, famine, ethnic conflicts, religious wars, and natural disasters which, in my view, stem from the continent’s failure to reflect on its past in the quest for lasting solutions. Having looked at the historical context of the emergence of ethno-philosophy or the project of cultural revivalism, and having closely examined the premises presented by Hountondji and Appiah against ethno-philosophy - which I consider to be unconvincing because of their tendency to glide into Western philosophical forms of thought - I argue that ethno-philosophy is just like Western philosophy, as it is based on a recognized form of reasoning, namely inductive reasoning, packaged in proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources. I also argue that religious beliefs are not an obstacle to the development of scientific thought in Africa; rather, they are an aid to it since both have complementary rather than opposing roles. KeywordsPhilosophy, ethno-philosophy, primitive unanimity, induction, African proverbs

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: (1) ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; (2) ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; (3) ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and (4) ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: (1) the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and (2) the debate about  ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions.Keywords: Ethno, African philosophy, Foundationalist, Universalist, Particularist, The common moral position (CMP), Ethnophilosophy

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