We document a large decrease in earnings inequality in Brazil between 1996 and 2012. Using administrative linked employer-employee data, we fit high-dimensional worker and firm fixed effects models to understand the sources of this decrease. Firm effects account for 40 percent of the total decrease and worker effects for 29 percent. Changes in observable worker and firm characteristics contributed little to these trends. Instead, the decrease is primarily due to a compression of returns to these characteristics, particularly a declining firm productivity pay premium. Our results shed light on potential drivers of earnings inequality dynamics.

We document a large decrease in earnings inequality in Brazil between 1996 and 2012. Using administrative linked employer-employee data, we fit high-dimensional worker and firm fixed-effects models to understand the sources of this decrease. Firm effects account for 40 percent of the total decrease and worker effects for 29 percent. Changes in observable worker and firm characteristics contributed little to these trends. Instead, the decrease is primarily due to a compression of returns to these characteristics, particularly a declining firm productivity-pay premium. Our results shed light on potential drivers of earnings inequality dynamics. (JEL D22, D63, J24, J31, L25, M52, O15)

No abstract

Are financial crises a negative shock to aggregate demand or supply? This is a fundamental question for research and policy making. Arguments for stimulus usually presume demand-side shortfalls; arguments for tax cuts or structural reform look to the supply side. Resolving the question requires models with both mechanisms, and empirical tests to tell them apart. We develop a small open economy model, where a country is subject to deleveraging shocks that impose binding credit constraints on households and/or firms. These financial crisis events leave distinct statistical signatures in the time series record that divide sharply between each type of shock. Empirical analysis reveals a clear picture: after financial crises the dominant pattern is that imports contract, exports hold steady or even rise, and the real exchange rate depreciates. History shows financial crises are predominantly a negative shock to demand. (JEL F14, F31, F41, G01, N10, N20, N70)

No abstract