Traditionally seen as an interlocutor between Europe and the US in transatlantic security relations, the UK's engagement with the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) through the concurrent EU and NATO missions presents an interesting case of foreign policy decision-making. Although a logic based on broader British orientations about the roles of the two organisations expect that the UK's primary institution of choice would be NATO, London supported both missions in providing international policing assistance to Afghanistan. Adopting an operational overlap perspective, this article seeks to explain the UK's strategic behaviour vis-a-vis the EU and NATO training missions that have been simultaneously involved in overlapping tasks, despite the initial intention that the two missions would undertake different and complementary roles. Analysing evidence from the UK Parliament and Government, US diplomatic missions, the EU and NATO, as well as interviews with former UK and NATO officials, this article argues that while providing training to the Afghan police, London focused on these missions' practical outputs rather than preferring an organisation of choice as such. This strategy is mainly guided by the UK's concern to uphold counter-narcotics enforcement in Afghanistan and to fulfil transition tasks during the incremental withdrawal of British troops.

This article investigates the policing assistance provided by Germany and France in Afghanistan through the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite being members of both organizations, Germany and France varied in their engagement with the two organizations' missions as well as in their strategies about police training in Afghanistan. Whereas Germany was a leading contributor to the EU mission, it did not formally operate under NATO mission's command. On the other hand, France was a key contributor to the latter mission, whilst being more reluctant to take part in the first. Using evidence drawn from the documents at national, EU-and NATOlevels, US cables, academic and news articles as well as interviews with practitioners and experts, this article argues that these two member states' police training strategies were shaped primarily by their domestic politics and broader foreign policy orientations, rather than the local conditions and realities on the ground. A key policy recommendation is that, while paying attention to the local environment of police training is crucial, policymakers should also plan the delivery of policing assistance by considering the political dynamics in their own constituencies.

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