Ce papier analyse un sondage dans les Républiques Tchèque et Slovaque ainsi qu'un sondage plus limité en Hongrie et en Pologne et conclut que la fraude fiscale est la plus basse parmis ceux qui sont persuadés de recevoir des prestations gouvernementales de qualité pour les impôts qu'ils paient. Une augmentation de 20% de la qualité perçue des services du gouvernement pourrait mener à une baisse de 13 % de la fréquence de la fraude fiscale. Cette analyse est la première de son genre à démontrer une influence si vaste de la qualité des services gouvernementaux sur la complaisance fiscale. Les gouvernements des pays en transition qui souffrent d'un appareil défectif de collection d'impôts gagneraient à transmettre une information claire sur la qualité de leurs services afin de réduire l'évasion fiscale. Copyright WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG 2004.

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An easy and popular method for measuring the size of the underground economy is to use macro data such as money demand or electricity demand to infer what the legitimate economy needs, and then to attribute the remaining consumption to the underground economy. Such inferences rely on the stability of parameters of the money demand and electricity demand equations, or at very least on knowledge of how these parameters are changing. We argue that the pace of change of these parameters is too variable in transition economies for the above methods of estimating the size of the underground economy to be applicable. We make our point by using Czech Republic and other transition country data from the financial and electricity sectors. Copyright (c) 2006 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2006 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development..

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Abstract. This paper measures the influence of campaign spending on incumbent and challenger votes in Canadian federal elections. The goal is to assess the influence of spending ceilings on political competition and on voter welfare. It is found that in the 1984 and 1988 Canadian federal elections challengers could increase their voteshare by spending but that incumbents could not. These results are used in a simulation to show that if ceilings were lowered, incumbent voteshare would rise. On this evidence it is argued that spending ceilings may tilt the playing field in favour of incumbents and reduce political competition.