Desirability and effects of campaign spending limits

Abstract

Abstract. This paper measures the influence of campaign spending on incumbent and challenger votes in Canadian federal elections. The goal is to assess the influence of spending ceilings on political competition and on voter welfare. It is found that in the 1984 and 1988 Canadian federal elections challengers could increase their voteshare by spending but that incumbents could not. These results are used in a simulation to show that if ceilings were lowered, incumbent voteshare would rise. On this evidence it is argued that spending ceilings may tilt the playing field in favour of incumbents and reduce political competition.

Incumbents and Challengers on a Level Playing Field: Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance in Brazil

“…While some comparativists echo Jacobson's claims and argue that campaign spending limits protect incumbents (e.g., Palda 1994;Palda and Palda 1998), my findings suggest the opposite: that campaign spending caps may increase electoral competitiveness. The key issue to focus on in future comparative research is the relative advantages incumbents and challengers possess.…”

“…Some comparativists have done precisely this: seePalda (1994) for Canada andPalda and Palda (1998) for France.…”

The Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent Spending

“…Our findings related to the variable campaign value of incumbency have direct implications for the ongoing debate over campaign finance reform. The argument from previous findings of less effective incumbent spending is that spending limits would hinder competition by disadvantaging challengers (e.g., Jacobson 1978; Palda 1993). Challengers would be less able to win votes through (more effective) campaigning, and incumbents would benefit even more from the fixed advantages of office, such as name recognition and free public exposure, further consolidating their already well‐entrenched positions.…”

“…Recent extensions to other contexts, furthermore, have demonstrated positive spending effects in a variety of national, local, and multiparty settings 2 . The extensive literature on campaign spending covers a multitude of issues (see, for example, Stratmann 2005), but the central one is whether spending money brings electoral success, in the sense of being positively linked both to votes and to the possibility of winning a seat (Carty and Eagles 1999; Cox and Thies 2000; Erickson and Palfrey 1996; Forrest 1997; Forrest, Johnston, and Pattie 1999; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1980; Johnston and Pattie 1995; Palda and Palda 1993).…”

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

“…Lindsay and Maloney (1988) envisage political parties as cartels on the supply side of legislation (to obtain a higher price from interest groups), and they report some empirical evidence consistent with this view. Others treat all incumbent politicians as an interest group and investigate whether incumbents try to restrict entry from new entrants either by reducing competition between them through geographical segmentation of the political market (Crain, 1977), or by adopting campaign spending regulation detrimental to challengers (Palda, 1994, Palda and Palda, 1985 -, try to obtain higher wages (McCormick and Tollison, 1978) or, third, try to regulate lobbyists in such a way as to benefit those in the legislature (Brinig et al, 1993).…”