No abstract

In an environment where three-person groups develop a creative solution to an important problem, we examine whether the efficacy of either individual- or group-based creativity-contingent incentives depends on whether they take the piece-rate or tournament form. We predict and find that group (intergroup) tournament pay increases group cohesion and collaborative efforts, which ultimately lead to a more creative group solution, relative to group piece-rate pay. While individual (intragroup) tournament pay increases individual efforts, we find that it does not enhance the creativity of group solutions relative to individual piece-rate pay. Our results advance the burgeoning management accounting literature on creativity-contingent incentives by demonstrating that reward systems are more likely to promote group creativity through collaborative efforts rather than independent individual efforts. We also provide important insights into when and why tournament pay can boost group creativity in organizations. In doing so, we contribute to a better understanding of observations from practice suggesting that organizations valuing creativity often induce intergroup competition. Data Availability: The experimental data are available upon request.

In this study, we examine whether interacting hierarchical teams outperform nominal hierarchical teams in electronic brainstorming. Our hierarchical audit teams were composed of 111 managers and seniors from two Big 4 accounting firms. We compare fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams for two tasks of varying complexity: a simpler task of fraud risk factor identification and a more complex task of fraud hypothesis generation. We find that nominal teams generate a significantly larger number of unique fraud risk factors and fraud hypotheses than interacting teams. Nominal teams also generate higher-quality fraud hypotheses. We provide evidence that social loafing by less experienced auditors in interacting teams drives the differences between nominal and interacting teams in the fraud hypothesis generation task. In addition, less experienced auditors have less developed mental simulations for frauds in interacting teams compared to those in nominal teams. A key contribution of our study is that it identifies the underlying mechanisms of the differential fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams.

We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999) . Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long-term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long-term price reversals but play little role in driving short-term momentum. Copyright (c) 2009 the American Finance Association.