We analyze the effects of corporate governance reforms on interlocking directorship (ID), and we assess the relationship between interlocking directorships and company performance for the main Italian firms listed on the Italian stock exchange over 1998-2007. We use a unique dataset that includes corporate governance variables related to the board size, interlocking directorships and variables related to companies' performances. The network analysis showed only some effectiveness of these reforms in slightly dispersing the web of companies. Using a diff-in-diff approach, we then find in the period considered a slight reduction in the returns of those companies where interlocking directorships were used the most, which confirms our assumption on the perverse effect of ID on company performance in a context prone to shareholder expropriation such as the Italian one.

Clinical trials frequently include multiple end points that mature at different times. The initial report, typically based on the primary end point, may be published when key planned co-primary or secondary analyses are not yet available. Clinical Trial Updates provide an opportunity to disseminate additional results from studies, published in JCO or elsewhere, for which the primary end point has already been reported. PURPOSE Five-year data of the phase III trial TAM-01 showed that low-dose tamoxifen at 5 mg once daily administered for 3 years in women with intraepithelial neoplasia (IEN) reduced by 52% the recurrence of invasive breast cancer or ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS), without additional adverse events over placebo. Here, we present the 10-year results. METHODS We randomly assigned 500 women with breast IEN (atypical ductal hyperplasia, lobular carcinoma in situ [LCIS], or hormone-sensitive or unknown DCIS) to low-dose tamoxifen or placebo after surgery with or without irradiation. The primary end point was the incidence of invasive breast cancer or DCIS. RESULTS The TAM-01 population included 500 women (20% atypical ductal hyperplasia, 11% LCIS, and 69% DCIS). The mean (±SD) age at the start of treatment was 54 ± 9 years, and 58% of participants were postmenopausal. After a median follow-up of 9.7 years (IQR, 8.3-10.9 years), 66 breast cancers (15 in situ; 51 invasive) were diagnosed: 25 in the tamoxifen group and 41 in the placebo group (annual rate per 1,000 person-years, 11.3 with tamoxifen v 19.5 with placebo; hazard ratio [HR], 0.58; 95% CI, 0.35 to 0.95; log-rank P = .03). Most recurrences were invasive (77%) and ipsilateral (59%). Regarding contralateral breast cancer incidence, there were six events in the tamoxifen arm and 16 in the placebo arm (HR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.14 to 0.92; P = .025). The number needed to be treated to prevent one case of breast event with tamoxifen therapy was 22 in 5 years and 14 in 10 years. The benefit was seen across all patient subgroups. There was a significant 50% reduction of recurrence with tamoxifen in the DCIS cohort, which represents 70% of the overall population (HR, 0.50; 95% CI, 0.28 to 0.91; P = .02). No between-group difference in the incidence of serious adverse events was reported during the prolonged follow-up period. CONCLUSION Tamoxifen 5 mg once daily for 3 years significantly prevents recurrence from noninvasive breast cancer after 7 years from treatment cessation without long-term adverse events.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The views expressed in the article represent exclusively the positions of the authors and do not involve in any way the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. We wish to thank Dimtri Boreiko, Valentina Colombo, Enrico Gagliardi, Matteo Gargantini, and Maurizio Murgia for their support. We thank Silvia Giacomelli, Frank Hahn and Andrea Polo for their comments. The paper was presented at the CESifo-Delphi Conference 2010 and at the 6th Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics. Terms of use: Documents in IntroductionThe Italian corporate governance system is characterized by large ownership concentration and the recourse to control-enhancing mechanisms in such a way which is conducive to controlling shareholders' dominance at the expenses of minority shareholders through the recourse to cross-shareholdings or shareholder alliances (Barker, 2010). The main evolutionary feature in the last few years has been the shift in the instruments used to ensure stability of control, that is, away from pyramids towards shareholders' coalitions (Bianchi and Bianco, 2006). The Italian system is also historically characterized by the widespread recourse to director interlocks and to cross-shareholdings (Ciocca, 2007).In turn, the role of independent directors as a guarantee against minority shareholder expropriation has been put in doubt in Italy because of the incomplete transparency regarding such their possible conflicts of interest , although in the last few years the disclosure standards practiced by the Italian listed companies seem to have progressed (Assonime, 2010). In 1998 a structural reform of corporate governance was implemented in order to open up the market for corporate control and to protect minorities (the Draghi Law). This reform was followed by further laws that went -not quite linearly -in the same direction. However, as observed by several authors surveyed by Barker (2010), companylevel corporate governance behavior has exhibited little response to the new legislation since incumbent block-holders have continued to dominate Italian corporations and have paid little concern to the interests of minority shareholders.Since the available literature indicates that several features of Italian corporate governance are conducive to minority shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders, the purpose of the present paper is to assess whether interlocking directorships (as of 1998 and 2007) may suggest the presence of shareholder expropriatio...

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