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This study assesses the impact of decision framing and the anticipated behavior of others on choosing to cooperate in social dilemma problems. Two hundred and eighty-eight students completed a questionnaire which presented two management scenarios representative of social dilemmas a manager might confront in a business environment. The two scenarios were based on parameters established by a generalized uniform N-person dilemma game. One scenario was described in a give-some context (contribute to the collective good); the other was presented in a take-some context (destruction of an existing collective good). After each scenario, information was presented concerning the response proportion of others, the certainty of the others' response, and whether others were expected to cooperate or defect. All four main effects were significant, as well as the interactions of response proportions by game context and response certainty by response direction. Reliable framing effects were evidenced. Individuals were more willing to contribute to a collective good than to experience some personal loss to avoid the destruction of an existing collective good. Findings raise questions concerning the extent of applicability of prospect theory to social dilemmas.