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This article examines the case for distributive fairness among states in the context of humanitarian intervention. I start by arguing that distributive fairness among interveners is important for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. I then discuss the worry that due to the nature of humanitarian intervention, fair burden sharing is difficult to achieve without compromising the operational effectiveness of interventions. I examine three responses that while they reduce the severity of this objection do not fully override it. Finally, in light of the objection I explore options for practical changes and institutional reform that could contribute to reconciling fair burden sharing with effective intervention. I conclude that fairness and effectiveness can be reconciled in the longer term by fully institutionalising humanitarian intervention and in the short term by distinguishing between the duty to undertake intervention and the duty to pay for it.

While some suggestions have been made as to how the duty to undertake humanitarian intervention should be assigned to specific states, the question of how to assign the duty to carry the economic and material costs remains underexplored. In this paper, I argue that the most plausible answer to this question is found in a pluralist approach. First, we should look to the Contribution to Problem Principle, according to which the costs are shared based on the historical responsibility of states for the occurrence of atrocities. For the many cases where this principle does not apply or needs to be supplemented, I suggest a novel alternative in the Entitlement-adjusted Ability Principle, according to which costs should be distributed based on states' levels of resources that have been tainted by historical rights violations.

This article contributes with a novel systematic theoretical and empirical exploration of why states find a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council attractive. Three conceptualizations of power—to influence, to network, and to gain status—guide the empirical analysis. A telephone interview survey with diplomatic staff at Member States’ permanent missions to the United Nations in New York provides readers with original and unique empirical knowledge of state perceptions of power. The candidature for a seat comes with expectations of influencing decision-making, despite modest estimations of the opportunity to have impact. Opportunities to network and to gain status are not frequent reasons for a candidature. Diplomats’ estimations are nevertheless higher on the opportunity to actually establish relevant relationships and to gain status brought by a seat.