In this article we compare the structuring of citizens' attitudes on foreign policy issues in the U.S.A. and Sweden. Most of the studies in this area have been carried out on U.S. data, which have made any generalization of the findings to other states difficult. The material is the 1995 SOM study, with a sample of 2,800 individuals. Swedish citizens' foreign policy attitudes were structured along two dimensions. The first dimension showed similarities with Wittkopf's “militant internationalism” dimension; the second dimension showed similarities with Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis's “multilateralism‐unilateralism” dimension. As in the United States, ideology has a high explanatory power on individuals' placement on the first dimension, but in Sweden gender and attitudes on “green issues” have some additional explanatory power. On the second dimension education has high explanatory power in both Sweden and the U.S.A., but in Sweden attitudes on “green issues” are also of importance. In the article we argue for a plausible theoretical interpretation of the Swedish foreign policy dimensions that is somewhat different from the one offered in the American case.

Given the vast amounts of research on party competition, party strategy, political communication and electoral campaigning, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the study of national party elites' perceptions of voters and public opinion. This article argues that the mindset of leading party officials, and more specifically their perceptions of voter and public opinion rationality, driving forces and knowledge, is a much‐neglected explanation for why parties adopt the electoral strategies they do. Analysed here are unique internal party documents from two Swedish parties during the period 1964 to 1991: the Social Democratic Party and the Conservative Party. A simple analytic framework is proposed for the study of party elite perceptions of voters and public opinion. In contrast to the overwhelmingly pessimistic view of voter rationality that still prevails in contemporary research, the findings presented in this article suggest that national party elites in general have had a surprisingly positive view of voters and, in particular, public opinion. Perceptions of voters and public opinion were largely unaffected by the parties' electoral fortunes, and did not become gloomier over time.

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We propose a framework for analysing party elite perceptions of voting behaviour based on four party competition and voting behaviour models: the Downsian proximity, saliency, competence and directional models. We analyse whether and to what extent party elite perceptions support these theories of party competition and voting behaviour. Empirical analysis is based solely on internal party documents from two Swedish parties, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, from 1964 to 1988/1991. We demonstrate that elements of all four party competition models have characterized Swedish party elite thinking and reasoning about voting behaviour in recent decades. Discussion in the Social Democratic elite was most in line with Downs' model. Until the mid-1970s, Downs' model tended to be combined with the competence model and thereafter with the saliency model. The Conservative elite clearly favoured the salience and competence models until the early 1970s and the saliency and Downs' models since then.

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