Consideration of the effects of domestic politics on international conflict behavior often consists simply of contrasting democracies with non-democracies. One notable exception is work that links economic performance and the use of force. This link has often been addressed through use of a diversionary perspective. In this paper, we argue that more important than the alleged incentive to pursue a rallying effect when times are bad are domestic political and economic factors affecting leaders' constraints, representing some of the costs to pursuing adventurous foreign policies. We examine three sources of constraints on democratic leaders: the willingness of the constituency to support the use of force internationally; the macroeconomic preferences of the party's constituency; and an interaction of those preferences with the state of the economy. We find that in developed democracies, the political orientation of the government is a significant factor affecting the likelihood of international conflict initiation. Specifically, right governments are more likely to initiate interstate disputes; economic conditions have a significant but lesser impact.The importance of domestic politics in shaping international relations has become increasingly accepted. Yet the consideration of domestic politics often consists simply of contrasting democracies and non-democracies, ignoring valuable differences within those two very broad categories. Not all democracies are the same; varying by structure (for example, presidential versus parliamentary), domestic economic circumstance (good versus bad times), or political orientation (that is, right versus left governments). We have come generally to accept that political structure matters. We have some evidence that the economic situation within a state has an effect on foreign policy, though the nature of this relationship and its explanation remain in dispute. We have less evidence that International Studies Quarterly (2009) 53, 955-975