Consideration of the effects of domestic politics on international conflict behavior often consists simply of contrasting democracies with non-democracies. One notable exception is work that links economic performance and the use of force. This link has often been addressed through use of a diversionary perspective. In this paper, we argue that more important than the alleged incentive to pursue a rallying effect when times are bad are domestic political and economic factors affecting leaders' constraints, representing some of the costs to pursuing adventurous foreign policies. We examine three sources of constraints on democratic leaders: the willingness of the constituency to support the use of force internationally; the macroeconomic preferences of the party's constituency; and an interaction of those preferences with the state of the economy. We find that in developed democracies, the political orientation of the government is a significant factor affecting the likelihood of international conflict initiation. Specifically, right governments are more likely to initiate interstate disputes; economic conditions have a significant but lesser impact.The importance of domestic politics in shaping international relations has become increasingly accepted. Yet the consideration of domestic politics often consists simply of contrasting democracies and non-democracies, ignoring valuable differences within those two very broad categories. Not all democracies are the same; varying by structure (for example, presidential versus parliamentary), domestic economic circumstance (good versus bad times), or political orientation (that is, right versus left governments). We have come generally to accept that political structure matters. We have some evidence that the economic situation within a state has an effect on foreign policy, though the nature of this relationship and its explanation remain in dispute. We have less evidence that International Studies Quarterly (2009) 53, 955-975

War outcomes are unlikely to effect elections if the major parties did not disagree over the war. Leaders who enter into wars are more likely to be punished for defeat or rewarded for victory if the opposition did not support the government during the war. Employing original data on legislative opposition during interstate wars, this paper examines all elections since WWII in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India. The results confirm that leaders are far more likely to be punished (rewarded) for bad (good) outcomes if the opposition did not support the war. Further, there is no direct effect of either war outcomes or the position of the opposition. It is only when considered in conjunction with the opposition's behavior that the important link between war outcomes and elections is revealed.

Arena, Philip and Scott Wolford. (2012) Arms, Intelligence, and War. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468‐2478.2012.00724.x 
© 2012 International Studies Association How do states respond to uncertainty over their opponents’ military strength? We analyze a model of crisis bargaining in which, prior to negotiation, an uninformed state chooses how to allocate scarce resources across armaments and intelligence gathering. Arming improves military capabilities, while intelligence gathering improves estimates of the other state's military capabilities. Our model thus allows both the distribution of power and the level of uncertainty in the crisis to be determined endogenously. We derive some notable results. First, the relationship between information revelation and war is conditional on beliefs held before the information is received, as more accurate information can reduce the probability of war for optimistic states but increase it for pessimistic ones. Second, the allocations that minimize the probability of war are often not those made in equilibrium. Finally, considering the interdependence between the two allocations yields unique insights into the relationship between the distribution of capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war.

We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe it provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.

Why do democracies sometimes fight long, politically divisive wars that end poorly? I argue that electoral accountability, induced by party competition, can sometimes promote this and other tragic outcomes. To demonstrate this, I analyze a bargaining model in which one state is conceived of as a unitary actor while the other consists of a government and an opposition that is motivated both by electoral ambition and concern for the national interest. Perhaps surprisingly, it is the opposition’s concern for the national interest that causes the most tragic outcomes, as they may choose not to advocate peace when doing so would prevent war so as to avoid undercutting the government’s bargaining position. I close with a discussion of why the United States appears to be particularly prone to such tragic outcomes, treating the Vietnam War as an illustrative example.