Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies

Abstract

Consideration of the effects of domestic politics on international conflict behavior often consists simply of contrasting democracies with non-democracies. One notable exception is work that links economic performance and the use of force. This link has often been addressed through use of a diversionary perspective. In this paper, we argue that more important than the alleged incentive to pursue a rallying effect when times are bad are domestic political and economic factors affecting leaders' constraints, representing some of the costs to pursuing adventurous foreign policies. We examine three sources of constraints on democratic leaders: the willingness of the constituency to support the use of force internationally; the macroeconomic preferences of the party's constituency; and an interaction of those preferences with the state of the economy. We find that in developed democracies, the political orientation of the government is a significant factor affecting the likelihood of international conflict initiation. Specifically, right governments are more likely to initiate interstate disputes; economic conditions have a significant but lesser impact.The importance of domestic politics in shaping international relations has become increasingly accepted. Yet the consideration of domestic politics often consists simply of contrasting democracies and non-democracies, ignoring valuable differences within those two very broad categories. Not all democracies are the same; varying by structure (for example, presidential versus parliamentary), domestic economic circumstance (good versus bad times), or political orientation (that is, right versus left governments). We have come generally to accept that political structure matters. We have some evidence that the economic situation within a state has an effect on foreign policy, though the nature of this relationship and its explanation remain in dispute. We have less evidence that International Studies Quarterly (2009) 53, 955-975

Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation

“…This pattern holds regardless of whether I use each party's overall ideology score (model 1) or only the international components of their manifestos (model 2). The results are consistent with previous studies showing right-wing governments to be more conflictual than left-wing governments (Palmer, London, and Regan 2004;Arena and Palmer 2009;Koch 2009;Koch and Sullivan 2010) and also provide support for Hypothesis 1.…”

Parliamentary peace or partisan politics? Democracies’ participation in the Iraq War

“…Some authors suggest that partisan politics helps to explain why certain countries participated and others did not, noting that it was primarily right-of-centre governments that gave political support for the Iraq War (Schuster and Maier 2006). 4 This perspective resonates with recent work on partisanship in relation to the use of force (Rathbun 2004;Arena and Palmer 2009). A different line of reasoning centres on national legislatures and their authority in security policy.…”

“…Schmidt 1996; Allan and Scruggs 2004). In recent years a number of studies have enlarged the scope of partisan influence analysis to the field of security studies, reporting systematic differences between left and right parties on substantive questions regarding the use of force (Palmer et al 2004;Rathbun 2004Rathbun , 2007Schuster and Maier 2006;Arena and Palmer 2009).…”

The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment

“…Related theories based on the assumption of democratic sensitivity to casualties suffer from a similar problem. 3 For example, Arena and Palmer (2009); Ireland and Gartner (2001); Kaarbo and Beasley (2008); Koch (2009); Koch and Gartner (2005) ;Palmer, London, and Regan (2004); and Weeks (2008). 4 The second limitation-the lack of a mechanism to explain how and when the pressure to win will pass from the first leader to a successor (hereafter, "replacement leader")-is not often mentioned in the literature, because scholars rarely focus on wartime leadership changes.…”