Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections

Arena, Philip

doi:10.1080/07388940802007249

Cited by 29 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Finally, these results contribute to a growing literature about the role of opposition parties in conflict (Schultz ; Ramsay ; Arena ). Parliamentary oppositions can have a key role in the foreign policy behavior of states by partially determining how soon the government will be held accountable to the electorate.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 62%

Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict

Williams

2013

Int Stud Q

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While there are a large number of studies examining the differences in conflict behavior due to varying institutional arrangements, scholars have not effectively addressed the differences in electoral cycles between systems with fixed versus flexible election timing. At the same time that parliamentary regimes give the Prime Minister the power to dissolve parliament, they give the parliament the power to remove the government with a vote of no-confidence. Together, these institutional attributes make the precise timing of the elections-and thus the public's opportunity to hold the government accountable-largely uncertain. I develop a theory that expectations of an upcoming election constrain the foreign policy decision making of executives, and induce pacific behavior. I estimate the probability of an election in a sample of 17 advanced parliamentary democracies from the 1950s to 2001. I find convincing support for my theory, as the probability of hostile dispute initiation is a function of those characteristics that influence the timing of elections, including majority support and the electoral cycle. More specifically, majority and minority governments face varying incentives to initiate disputes because of the different risks of an immediate election.Electorally motivated leaders make foreign policy choices with an eye toward the next election. In this manner, the threat of performing poorly in an upcoming election constrains the foreign policy behavior of executives. It is peculiar, then, that scholars have not effectively addressed the differences in electoral cycles between systems with fixed versus flexible election timing. In these systems, an election can be called at virtually any time as a result of decisions made by the government-by dissolving parliament-or the opposition-via a successful vote of no-confidence. Though both actors can trigger early elections and an election must be called by a specific date, the exact timing of elections is often uncertain and the object of intense speculation. If executives choose their foreign policies with an eye toward the next election, then we should give more attention to the differences in election timing in systems with fixed versus flexible timing.I develop a theory that electoral cycles influence the conflict behavior by determining the timing of the opportunities for the public to hold the government accountable. As the anticipated risk of an early election increases, governments become less aggressive because of fear of electoral retribution. I test this theory on a sample of 17 advanced parliamentary democracies from the 1950s to 2001. I first use country-specific models of election timing based on government-and national-level attributes as well as policy performance to generate the probability of an immediate election, which I argue represents an accurate approximation of real-world expectations. My expectation is that the probability of dispute initiation will be highest when the probability of an early election is lowest. I find support for this prop...

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 62%

Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict

Williams

2013

Int Stud Q

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“…If leaders' education increases political leaders, democratic institutions, and war outcomes. For example, Arena (2008) shows that war outcomes are more likely to affect the leader's fate in the next election if the major parties disagreed on the initiation of war. Potter (2007:363) links competence and crisis occurrence with little mention of crisis outcomes, claiming that "the variables that affect the initiation of conflict are not necessarily those that contribute to its escalation (Kinsella and Russett 2002).…”

Section: Crises and Competencementioning

confidence: 99%

Following an Experienced Shepherd: How a Leader’s Tenure Affects the Outcome of International Crises

Ausderan

2015

International Interactions

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Previous research has shown that a leader's preconflict tenure affects the likelihood of conflict occurrence, while conflict outcomes affect a leader's postconflict tenure. I argue that a leader's preconflict tenure should affect not only conflict occurrence but conflict outcomes as well, specifically by increasing a leader's professional competence and increasing the likelihood that the state will emerge victorious from international crises. This effect should weaken as the constraints upon leaders' behaviors increase and their competence becomes less important for policy outcomes. Using a bivariate probit model with selection and a dyadic data set on international crises experienced by 195 countries between 1950 and 2000, I find moderate-to-strong support for the hypotheses.

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“…Schultz (:72) acknowledges the existence of rally effects but argues that these effects tend to be temporary and that they are shorter and less politically consequential if the opposition does not support the government (Brody and Shapiro ; see also Arena ). It is true that rally effects are generally short, but that does not mean they are necessarily inconsequential, because governments are sometimes able to exploit temporary rally effects to weaken the opposition .…”

Section: The Opposition's Incentives and Capacity For Blocking Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also assume that r d (∙) increases faster than r a (∙), or that

\frac{\partial r_{d}}{\partial x} \geq \frac{\partial r_{a}}{\partial x}

for all x . The voting public is more sensitive to each group's policy position when there is policy disagreement (Schultz ; Arena ). The probability of a policy's success increases as the challenging state's expected value of war, w ch , increases.…”

Section: Opposition With Resources: a Formal Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is based on the systematic tendency for publics in both democratic and nondemocratic states, aroused by external threats to the nation, to respond to a foreign policy crisis or war by supporting the government in power. 4 Schultz (2001:72) acknowledges the existence of rally effects but argues that these effects tend to be temporary and that they are shorter and less politically consequential if the opposition does not support the government (Brody and Shapiro 1989; see also Arena 2008). It is true that rally effects are generally short, but that does not mean they are necessarily inconsequential, because governments are sometimes able to exploit temporary rally effects to weaken the opposition.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Opposition Politics and International Crises: A Formal Model

2014

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Democratic foreign policy choices are a function of expected international outcomes and the preferences, power, and information of domestic actors. Studies of domestic political competition and international crisis bargaining have argued that an opposition's policy positions send credible signals of the government's intentions to adversarial target states. This paper contends that while opposition behavior may send informative signals, it can also directly constrain the policy options of the government. We relax previous assumptions that the opposition cannot directly prevent war or influence the outcomes of war (Schultz 2001). Instead, we assume that the opposition controls some political resources and attempts to influence the government's policy decisions in a way that advances its own partisan interests. To empirically demonstrate the theoretical differences in our model in comparison with previous domestic opposition models, we examine the case of the Quasi-War of 1798 between the United States and France.Among the leading trends in the study of international conflict during the last two decades is the rapidly growing interest in the domestic sources of state foreign policies and international outcomes. This interest has led to major research projects on the democratic peace, the diversionary theory of war, the influence of domestic economic and ethnic groups, the impact of societal culture and ideology, and the role of public opinion. One important and influential line of research focuses on the role of domestic political oppositions in international crises and war, with particular attention to the strategic interaction among governments, oppositions, and external adversaries. Beginning with Schultz (1998Schultz ( , 2001, this domestic opposition research found that opposition behavior can signal the resolve of the government. This helps democracies demonstrate the credibility of their threats during crises.Although standard signaling models of opposition behavior have contributed significantly to our understanding of democratic crisis behavior, they underestimate the constraining effect that domestic opposition can have on a government. Among other things, they neglect the fact that oppositions possess political resources that can help deter the government from initiating conflict or force the government to back down after a threat has been challenged. They also neglect the lasting political consequences of rally effects. Incorporating these assumptions leads to different theoretical predictions than do the standard opposition signaling models.The paper is structured as follows. We begin with a review of the domestic opposition literature. Next, we justify our assumptions that in many political systems the opposition controls adequate resources to warrant an attempt to block war or to interfere with the successful conduct of the war, and rally effects can have lasting political consequences. We then construct a formal model of the strategic interaction of governments, oppositions, and adversaries. The mode...

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Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections

Cited by 29 publications

References 44 publications

Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict

Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict

Following an Experienced Shepherd: How a Leader’s Tenure Affects the Outcome of International Crises

Opposition Politics and International Crises: A Formal Model

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