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This article contains an analysis of the constitutional theory of Nobel Prize winning economist James M. Buchanan. It proceeds through an explanation of his main doctrinal inputs, breaking down those principles which are of interest for constitutional doctrine, and which can be used as a theoretical foundation for the "constitutionalisation" of economic governance mechanisms in Europe. The paper shows that Buchanan developed a complete and sui generis theory of Constitution from the neo-contractualist paradigm of the 70s, and under the parameter of his methodological individualism, which led him to defend the new constitutional categories and normative proposals, which were also not exempt from contradictions and criticisms.

ResumenEl presente artículo tiene por objeto el estudio de la problemática jurídica que ha suscitado a lo largo de la reciente historia de los Estados Unidos la posible constitucionalización de la estabilidad presupuestaria, analizando las repercusiones de ésta a través de las experiencias estatales y del complejo marco institucional de la democracia norteamericana a nivel federal. Con ello, se perfilarán las cuestiones que más dudas suscitan en torno a la balanced budget desde el prisma constitucional y que pueden repetirse en cualquier proceso de similares características.

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