Kenya's March 2013 elections ushered in a popular system of devolved government that represented the country's biggest political transformation since independence. Yet within months there were public calls for a referendum to significantly revise the new arrangements. This article analyses the campaign that was led by the newly elected governors in order to understand the ongoing disputes over the introduction of decentralisation in Kenya, and what they tell us about the potential for devolution to check the power of central government and to diffuse political and ethnic tensions. Drawing on Putnam's theory of two-level games, we suggest that Kenya's new governors have proved willing and capable of acting in concert to protect their own positions because the pressure that governors are placed under at the local level to defend county interests has made it politically dangerous for them to be co-opted by the centre. As a result, the Kenyan experience cannot be read as a case of ‘recentralisation’ by the national government, or as one of the capture of sub-national units by ‘local elites’ or ‘notables’. Rather, decentralisation in Kenya has generated a political system with a more robust set of checks and balances, but at the expense of fostering a new set of local controversies that have the potential to exacerbate corruption and fuel local ethnic tensions in some parts of the country.

Digital technologies are increasingly used in elections around the world. Where the resources and capacity of the state are limited, some have argued that such technologies make it possible to rapidly "leapfrog" to cleaner and more credible elections. This article argues that the growing use of these technologies has been driven by the fetishization of technology rather than by rigorous assessment of their effectiveness; that they may create significant opportunities for corruption that (among other things) vitiate their potential impact; and that they carry significant opportunity costs. Indeed, precisely because new technology tends to deflect attention away from more "traditional" strategies, the failure of digital checks and balances often renders an electoral process even more vulnerable to rigging than it was before. These observations are not intended as a manifesto against the digitization of elections; apart from anything else, we argue that the drivers of the adoption of these new methods are too powerful to resist. But the analysis draws attention to the importance of more careful assessments of the problems, as well as the benefits, of such technologiesand to the need for more careful planning in their deployment.

Against a history of a divided Kalenjin/Kikuyu vote and election-related violence, and a contemporary context of high levels of inter-communal mistrust and intervention by the International Criminal Court (ICC), this article explains the Jubilee Alliance's success amongst Kalenjin and Kikuyu voters in the Rift Valley in the 2013 election. To do this, it examines the pre-election context, election results in Kalenjin-and Kikuyu-dominated areas, local political debates, and election campaigns to reveal how the 'Uhuruto' team persuaded local residents to support this seemingly unlikely political marriage in all six elections. It is argued that the alliance used existing and emergent communal narratives of justice and competition to recast socio-economic and political debates in a way that persuaded the majority of Kalenjin and Kikuyu to support Jubilee -and to vote against Raila Odinga and the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) -as a way to protect and further their individual and collective interests. In making this argument, particular attention is given to relations between community members, and to popular support and investment in peace; negotiations between Uhuru and Ruto, and Kalenjin 'hosts' and Kikuyu 'guests'; the reinterpretation of the ICC as a performance of injustice; and successful presentation of 'Uhuruto' as a youthful team that could bring about peace and meaningful change as compared with an old, vengeful, incumbent Odinga Odinga.

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Ethnic identities are best understood as complex and contested social constructs, perpetually in the process of creation (c.f. Berman, 1998). It is with the perpetual processes of evolution, devolution, change and conformity of ethnic identities, often perceived to be cultural givens, that this paper concerns itself. Ethnicity is a politically relevant signifier in contemporary Kenya, and drawing on evidence from Kenya's Rift Valley Province and Western Province, the paper looks at the ways in which ‘modern’ Kenyans can, and do, contest, revive, create, negotiate and renegotiate their ethnic identity. The paper reveals how ethnic communities can both contract and/or expand, and how individual actors and groups can draw on selective memories and histories to justify their ‘migration’ from one community to another; while the relevant content of ethnic units is open to both debate and contestation. The paper provides detailed evidence of the fact and nature of ethnic construction, deconstruction and creation in the Kenyan postcolony and reveals how processes of ethnic negotiation and renegotiation are ultimately fuelled by the desire to stake claims to, and access resources controlled by the Kenyan state and external agents. Ultimately, the negotiation and renegotiation of ethnicity is inexorably intertwined with common perceptions of how political representation and redistribution actually works in Kenya, and with the perceived opportunities for advancement in both domestic and/or international arenas and forums.