Electing the ‘alliance of the accused’: the success of the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya's Rift Valley

Abstract

Against a history of a divided Kalenjin/Kikuyu vote and election-related violence, and a contemporary context of high levels of inter-communal mistrust and intervention by the International Criminal Court (ICC), this article explains the Jubilee Alliance's success amongst Kalenjin and Kikuyu voters in the Rift Valley in the 2013 election. To do this, it examines the pre-election context, election results in Kalenjin-and Kikuyu-dominated areas, local political debates, and election campaigns to reveal how the 'Uhuruto' team persuaded local residents to support this seemingly unlikely political marriage in all six elections. It is argued that the alliance used existing and emergent communal narratives of justice and competition to recast socio-economic and political debates in a way that persuaded the majority of Kalenjin and Kikuyu to support Jubilee -and to vote against Raila Odinga and the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) -as a way to protect and further their individual and collective interests. In making this argument, particular attention is given to relations between community members, and to popular support and investment in peace; negotiations between Uhuru and Ruto, and Kalenjin 'hosts' and Kikuyu 'guests'; the reinterpretation of the ICC as a performance of injustice; and successful presentation of 'Uhuruto' as a youthful team that could bring about peace and meaningful change as compared with an old, vengeful, incumbent Odinga Odinga.

Ethnic diversity and development in Kenya: limitations of ethnicity as a category of analysis

“…The Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance of 2013 was inconceivable in 2008 at the peak of the ethnic clashes, yet it happened almost seamlessly. So far, the explanation being forwarded by analysts rest on elite realignment (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 2014;Lynch, 2014;Mueller, 2014;Warah, 2013). And, even in the context of post-2008 violence, the 2013 elections experience was not exceptional; the same outcome had been presented in the 2010 Constitutional In the 2013 elections, violence was still possible (Cheeseman et al, 2014;Mueller, 2014), but the institutional environment was hostile to that outcome.…”

A Lexico-Pragmatic Interpretation of Peace in the 2013 Kenyan Presidential Campaign Speeches Regarding Conflict Management

“…Lynch [26] argues that many people have feared the Kikuyu and resented the perceived encroachment of Kikuyu onto land that many Kalenjin were displaced from during the colonial period, and never adequately compensated for. In the hearers" encyclopeadic memory, the Kalenjin had rallied behind PC2 in 2007 through whom they saw the opportunity to recover their land.…”

“…In (26), the FGD participants argued that PC3 used his party"s name Amani "peace" to prevent violence in elections. In (26), the FGD participants argued that the name Amani, a party name, had the potential to calm people and make them vote peacefully. This went beyond the literal meaning of absence of war.…”

“…This went beyond the literal meaning of absence of war. From FGD responses on (26) and (27), the sense encoded by the concept peace was broadened to express the ad hoc concept PEACE* to not only denote his party"s name, but also its ability to prevent violence in the 2013 elections as well as compel people to be calm and vote peacefully. PC3"s creativity in the use of the concept amani "peace" was also reflected in example (28).…”

“…In conclusion, though the lexical items "peace" employed in presidential campaign speeches regarding conflict management was relevant in some ways, it was irrelevant in others. Hence the contention that 2013 elections were peaceful is questioned which proves Lynch [26] assertion that the peace was superficial and cosmetics. In Galtung"s [27] words, what resulted was negative peace characterized by absence of violence, pessimism and peace not by peaceful means.…”