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The Three-Independent-Gate Field-Effect Transistor (TIGFET) is a promising beyond-CMOS technology which offers multiple modes of operation enabling unique capabilities such as the dynamic control of the device polarity and dual-threshold voltage characteristics. These operations can be used to reduce the number of transistors required for logic implementation resulting in compact logic designs and reductions in chip area and leakage current.However, the evaluation of TIGFET-based design currently relies on a close approximation for the Power, Performance, and Area (PPA) rather than traditional layout-based methods. To allow for a systematic evaluation of the design area, we present here a publicly available Predictive Process Design Kit (PDK) for a 10 nm-diameter silicon-nanowire TIGFET device. This work consists of a SPICE model and full custom physical design files including a Design Rule Manual, a Design Rule Check, and Layout Versus Schematic decks for Calibre®. We validate the design rules through the implementation of basic logic gates and a full-adder and compare extracted metrics with the FreePDK15nm TM PDK. We show 26% and 41% area reduction in the case of an XOR gate and a 1-bit fulladder design respectively. Applications for this PDK with respect to hardware security benefits are supported through a differential power analysis study.

Semiconductor design houses rely on third-party foundries to manufacture their integrated circuits (IC). While this trend allows them to tackle fabrication costs, it introduces security concerns as external (and potentially malicious) parties can access critical parts of the designs and steal or modify the Intellectual Property (IP). Embedded FPGA (eFPGA) redaction is a promising technique to protect critical IPs of an ASIC by redacting (i.e., removing) critical parts and mapping them onto a custom reconfigurable fabric. Only trusted parties will receive the correct bitstream to restore the redacted functionality. While previous studies imply that using an eFPGA is a sufficient condition to provide security against IP threats like reverseengineering, whether this truly holds for all eFPGA architectures is unclear, thus motivating the study in this paper. We examine the security of eFPGA fabrics generated by varying different FPGA design parameters. We characterize the power, performance, and area (PPA) characteristics and evaluate each fabric's resistance to SAT-based bitstream recovery. Our results encourage designers to work with custom eFPGA fabrics rather than off-the-shelf commercial FPGAs and reveals that only considering a redaction fabric's bitstream size is inadequate for gauging security.

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