We examine the importance of liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk in the U.S. overnight interbank market during the financial crisis of 2008. Our findings suggest that counterparty risk plays a larger role than does liquidity hoarding: the day after Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, loan terms become more sensitive to borrower characteristics. In particular, poorly performing large banks see an increase in spreads of 25 basis points, but are borrowing 1% less, on average. Worse performing banks do not hoard liquidity. While the interbank market does not freeze entirely, it does not seem to expand to meet latent demand.

We are grateful to Todd Keister for his feedback at various stages. We also thank Darrell Duffie, Huberto Ennis and Tan Wang for comments. Lagos thanks the support from the C.V.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractThere is substantial heterogeneity in the structure of trading relationships in the U.S. overnight interbank lending market: Some banks rely on spot transactions, while most form stable, concentrated borrowing relationships to hedge liquidity needs. As a result, borrowers pay lower prices and borrow more from their concentrated lenders. Exogenous shocks to liquidity supply (days with low GSE lending) lead to marketwide drops in liquidity and a rise in interest rates. However, borrowers with concentrated lenders are almost completely insulated from the shocks, while liquidity transmission affects the rest of the market via higher interest rates and reduced borrowing volumes.

We develop a model of the market for federal funds that explicitly accounts for its two distinctive features: banks have to search for a suitable counterparty, and once they meet, both parties negotiate the size of the loan and the repayment. The theory is used to answer a number of positive and normative questions: What are the determinants of the fed funds rate? How does the market reallocate funds? Is the market able to achieve an efficient reallocation of funds? We also use the model for theoretical and quantitative analyses of policy issues facing modern central banks.

In large-value real-time gross settlement payment systems, banks rely heavily on incoming funds to finance outgoing payments. Such reliance necessitates a high degree of coordination and synchronization. We construct a model of a payment system calibrated for the U.S. Fedwire system and examine the impact of realistic disruptions motivated by the recent financial crisis. In such settings, individually cautious behavior can have a significant and detrimental impact on the overall functioning of the payment system through a multiplier effect. Our results quantify the mutually reinforcing nature of greater caution, and allow comparative statics analysis of shifts in key parameters.JEL codes: D85, E42, E58, G21 THE COMPLEX WEB OF transactions in the economy is mirrored by the payment flows that settle those transactions, and the smooth functioning of the payment system is an essential part of the infrastructure of a well-functioning economy. Although issues regarding the payment and settlement system are relegatedWe are grateful to Charles M. Kahn, Gabrielle Demange, and Fabio Castiglionesi for constructive discussions of the paper and to