ĮvadasVartydamas senus -studijų laikų prof. Egidijaus Jarašiūno lyginamosios konstitucinės teisės skaitytų paskaitų konspektus, juose aptikau skyrių apie žmogaus teisių koncepcijas. Iš studijų laikų pamenu, kad būtent ši problematika tuomet man nepadarė kažkokio įspūdžio, nors užrašuose Vilniaus universiteto Teisės fakulteto Viešosios teisės katedros profesorius socialinių mokslų daktaras Saulėtekio al. 9, I rūmai, LT-10222 Vilnius Tel. (+370 5) 236 61 65 El. paštas: g.mesonis@lrkt.lt Straipsnyje analizuojama, kokią reikšmę turi skirtingos koncepcijos atskleidžiant konkrečios žmogaus teisės turinį. Konstatuojama, kad net "Vakarų" demokratinėse valstybėse sprendžiant dėl žmogaus teisių turinio nuolat konkuruoja individualistinis ir traibalistinis požiūris į žmogaus teises. Esama koncepcijų dichotomija šiame straipsnyje iliustruojama žodžio laisvės turinio raidos kontekste. Straipsnyje į šios teisės turinio raidą žvelgiama per valstybės vėliavos teisinį statusą, analizuojant Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų Aukščiausiojo Teismo jurisprudencijos ir kitų šalių teisinio reguliavimo patirtį. Konstatuojama, kad anglų-amerikiečių (liberalioji) žmogaus teisių ir laisvių koncepcija, spręsdama žmogaus teisės turinio problemą, prioritetą linkusi atiduoti konkretaus asmens, o ne grupės interesui.The article analyses the significance of different conceptions in disclosing the content of a concrete human right. It is stated that even in "western" democratic states, when one decides regarding the content of human rights, there is continuous competition between the individualistic and tribalistic approach to human rights. The existing dichotomy of these conceptions is illustrated in the context of the development of the content of freedom of speech. In the article the development of the content of this right is considered through the legal status of the flag, while analysing the experience of the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and that of legal regulation of other countries. It is stated that the Anglo-American (liberal) conception of human rights, while deciding the issue of the content of a human right, tends to give priority to the interest of a concrete person, but not that of a group.Mažuma gali būti ir teisi, tuomet, kai dauguma visuomet neteisi. Henrik IbsenAsmens teisės nėra tai, dėl ko galima balsuoti; dauguma neturi teisės balsuoti dėl mažumos teisių; teisių politinė paskirtis apsaugoti mažumos teises nuo daugumos (svarbiausia mažuma žemėje yra konkretus individas) ayn rand

Gediminas mesonisVilniaus universiteto Teisės fakulteto Viešosios teisės katedros profesorius socialinių mokslų daktaras Saulėtekio al. 9, I rūmai, LT-10222 Vilnius Tel. (+370 5) 236 61 75 El. paštas: gediminas.mesonis@tf.vu.lt Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos problemos, susijusios su teisės konstitucionalizavimu. Konstatuojama, kad, nors teisės konstitucionalizavimas yra de jure konstitucinės prigimties, tačiau tokia teisės raida objektyviai susiduria su probleminiais aspektais. Pabrėžiama, kad teisės konstitucionalizavimo dinamiką tik menkai nulemia konstitucinės justicijos institucijų veikla. Konstatuojama, kad teisinio reguliavimo dinamiškumas ir subjektų, galinčių inicijuoti konstitucingumo patikrą, aktyvumas yra tie šaltiniai, kurie turi įtakos šio proceso spartai ir mastui.This article deals with the problems of the dynamic of the process of constitucionalization of laws. This article shows the paradoxical aspect of the process of constitutionalization of laws. Even though constitutionalization proceeds when institutions of constitutional justice execute control on legal acts legitimacy, still intensity of legal system constitutionalization is not being determined by the constitutional justice institution. The scope of the particular country's contitutionalization of law depends on society, to be precise, on the subjects of legal relations, on legal consciousness and initiative on the need and value of the constitutionalization of law.

While analysing constitutions of various countries in the legal literature, typically not only the form and the content but also the structure of the constitution is discussed. The structure of the constitution is an internal organisational order of the norms of the constitution. Although every state’s constitution has a unique structure, certain regularities can be discerned. The analysis of the structure of various constitutions leads to the conclusion that normally each constitution consists of the following standard structural parts: the preamble, the main part, the final, transitional or additional provisions, and in some constitutions there can also be annexes. The article confirms that most constitutions begin with an introductory part, the preamble. Only the constitutions of several countries (e.g. Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece) contain no preamble. The preamble reflects the historical context and the circumstances of the adoption of a constitution, names the goals of the constitutional regulation, fortifies the values to be attained, declares the key political principles or even the fundamental human rights and freedoms, etc. Often the preamble reveals the methods of adoption of a constitution. The preamble is an important structural part of the constitution that helps to understand the established constitutional regulation. The principles enshrined in it can be considered a significant argument for the constitutional justice institutions while solving the case of whether the law or any other legal act in question contradicts the constitution. The preamble is not only a political, ideological, and/or philosophical category; it undoubtedly also carries a legal burden, therefore it is considered to have legal validity. Preambles are characterized as having a so-called higher style; they are usually formulated not in compliance with the requirements of legal technique.

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The significance of the most important legal act-the Constitution-to the social medium is evident. This constituent act of the nation determines the legal, political, moral and social life of the social medium. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the Constitution-the content of this constituent act-is the object of everybody’s attention. The Constitution is interpreted by lawyers, public leaders, state institutions, scholars and individual persons. The article analyses the wide-ranging subjects interpreting the Constitution and presents the types of its interpreters. The three most prominent groups of such subjects can be distinguished as: (i) institutions of constitutional justice, (ii) the scholarly doctrine, and (iii) other subjects. The article discusses the legal, scientific and social value of interpretations of the Constitution formulated by these interpreters. It is held that the most meaningful thing in this typology is distinguishing the interpretations according to the factor of their legal effects. The differing scientific, legal and social value of the interpretations does not deny the factor of the significance of their existence. It is recognised that a large number of interpretations of the content of the Constitution come from an immanently related state of discussions taking place in a state under the rule of law and democratic society.