American experts on the Soviet Union have given much of their time to discussing whether the Russian communist government is going to remain “totalitarian” or instead turn “liberal.” Journalists and scholars alike judge Soviet policies and decrees largely according to whether or not they extend more “freedom” to the Russian people. Similarly, American writers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries almost never inquired as to what purposes the Russian imperial government's policies and decrees were actually intended to serve but only how liberal they were or were not. When one writer said that the Tsar was liberalizing, another would reply that he had not actually surrendered any of his arbitrary power and that Russia was still as oppressive as ever. In American eyes, then, the Russian state apparently cannot move except along a single line that extends from freedom to oppression, democracy to absolutism, similarity to Western institutions to dissimilarity. If Russia is not moving toward one of these poles, then she is not moving at all. Few have suggested that Russian statesmen have been operating along other lines and coping with other problems. Seldom has it occurred to American observers that the question of liberalization has actually been rather a minor one in Russian development.

The Stolypin Land Reform was a series of actions taken by the Russian Imperial government during the years 1905-17 to cope with the social and economic problems of the European Russian peasants. The basic part of any analysis of the Reform, therefore, should be a description of these actions as a coherent historical development in themselves. This essay presents such a description. The discussion is divided into four topics: general interpretation, the problems the Reform had to cope with, the general outline of its evolution, and the role of force in its execution. Related topics, such as the historical forces or events which produced the Reform, its results, or its significance in larger developments, are mentioned only incidentally.

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Each of the foregoing articles deals with a separate department of Soviet government. Thomas Remington’s State Control Commissariat began as an agency for auditing accounts; David Christian’s procuracy has always had the task of checking on the legality of the government’s operation. In practice the two departments seem to have been doing the same thing: sending out agents with virtually arbitrary power in the hope that they will make the government’s operating departments obey the government’s rules and perform their tasks with maximum efficiency. Remington refers to this activity as control. Christian calls it supervision. Christian’s term monitoring comes close to describing both activities.

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