Most of studies on corporate governance are based on the Anglo-Saxon view. However in France the majority of the top managers graduate from Ena and Polytechnic. Belonging to one or the other of these two clans, with the underlying link to the civil service, can have serious repercussions on the system of corporate governance. The clan tries to increase their power in the firms. In order to do this, it needs to control firms’ leaders, but also the board of directors. The control of the board allows the system to master all shareholders’ objections. It is also a means to widen its influence. This study proposes an analysis of the links between the characteristics of leaders and boards as well as the consequences of this control of the clan on the performance of the firm.

The debate over Corporate Governance has been gathering pace in France for several years. Most of the studies on this topic are based on the Anglo-Saxon view. It should nevertheless be noted that French capitalism has peculiarities, which have their origin in its methods of Corporate Governance. Carminatti-Marchand and Paquerot [2000] underline the specificities of the principles of Corporate Governance in France. An essential aspect of this is the nature of the leaders of major companies: more than 50% of the bigger French firms CEOs are graduated from Polytechnic Institute (familiarly referred to as “X”) and of ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration). Since 1995, however, the economic and financial environment of French companies has changed considerably. We note today the omnipresence of foreign investors on the Paris Stock Exchange. That presence alters the rules of Corporate Governance and gives us reason to believe that a movement of convergence towards the directors and managers who are graduates of ENA and/or Polytechnic? The results of the study reveal significant losses of posts for graduates of X and ENA in the management structures of large French companies between 1995 and 1999

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