We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels significantly except in first and last periods. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive. This effect is in contrast to most alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.

The financial burden for EU health systems associated with cardiovascular disease (CV) has been estimated to be nearly €110 billion in 2006, corresponding to 10 % of total healthcare expenditure across EU or a mean €223 annual cost per capita. The main purpose of this study is to estimate the costs related to hypertension and the economic impact of increasing adherence to anti-hypertensive therapy in five European countries (Italy, Germany, France, Spain and England). A probabilistic prevalence-based decision tree model was developed to estimate the direct costs of CV related to hypertension (CV defined as: stroke, heart attack, heart failure) in five European countries. Our model considered adherence to hypertension treatment as a main driver of blood pressure (BP) control (BP \ 140/ 90 mmHg). Relative risk of CV, based on controlled or uncontrolled BP group, was estimated from the Framingham Heart Study and national review data. Prevalence and cost data were estimated from national literature reviews. A national payer (NP) perspective for 10 years was considered. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis was performed in order to evaluate uncertainty around the results (given as 95 % confidence intervals). The model estimated a total of 8.6 million (1.4 in Italy, 3.3 in Germany, 1.2 in Spain, 1.8 in France and 0.9 in England) CV events related to hypertension over the 10-year time horizon. Increasing the adherence rate to antihypertensive therapy to 70 % (baseline value is different for each country) would lead to 82,235 fewer CV events (24,058 in Italy,7,870 in Germany,18,870 in Spain,24,855 in France and 6,553 in England). From the NP perspective, the direct cost associated with hypertension was estimated to be €51.3Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10198-013-0554-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 123Eur J Health Econ (2015) 16:65-72 DOI 10.1007 billion (8.1 in Italy, 17.1 in Germany, 12.2 in Spain, 8.8 in France and 5.0 in England). Increasing adherence to antihypertensive therapy to 70 % would save a total of €332 million (CI 95 %: €319-346 million) from the NPs perspective. This study is the first attempt to estimate the economic impact of non-adherence amongst patients with diagnosed hypertension in Europe, using data from five European countries (Italy, France, Germany, Spain and England).

We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels significantly except in first and last periods. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive. This effect is in contrast to most alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.

This is a study about the possibility of self-governance. We designed two versions of a step-level public good game, with or without a centralized sanctioning mechanism (CSM). In a baseline treatment participants play 14 rounds of the non-CSM game. In an automatic removal (AR) treatment participants play 7 rounds with CSM plus 7 rounds without CSM. In voted removal (VR) participants play 7 rounds with CSM followed by a voting stage to decide whether to keep CSM. All VR groups removed CSM. Contributions in AR and VR after CSM removal are dramatically higher than in the baseline. Most groups with a CSM history managed to cooperate until the last round. We do not find more cooperation in VR than in AR. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007Public good, Step-level, Sanctioning institution, Cooperation, Education, Trust,

The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind.