Since the late 1990s, shifts in the nature of the global financial integration of developing and emerging countries have exposed them to new forms of external vulnerability. This article explores such in the South African case. The article shows a precipitous growth in the magnitude of South African assets held and traded by international investorsincreasingly institutional investors and 'other' financial institutions, such as hedge funds and complex investment vehicles. The composition of these assets, and the motivation for trading, has also altered, shifting towards a complex set of rand-denominated, short-term assets in equity, bond and derivative markets traded for capital gains. Given this, the article contends that it is the portfolio considerations of such investors, rather than economic 'fundamentals', that have come to determine key economic prices, including the exchange rate, causing volatility, large swings and sudden adjustments. This, it is argued, places monetary policy in a predicament. In the context of liberalised capital accounts, together with the prioritisation of inflation targeting, open-market interventions are ineffective at managing exchange rate movements and volatility, and often reinforce both the patterns of trading and subsequent vulnerabilities while carrying their own costs. In these respects, the nature of South Africa's global financial integrations has exposed it to new forms of external vulnerability, with both these developments, and associated monetary policies, deepening the financialisation of the South African economy.

Using a simple Bayesian ‘mixed effects’ hierarchical model we provide econometric estimates of annual 2020 employment losses in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic for 15 SADC member states on the basis of historical GDP data between 2000 and 2019 and 2020 forecasts. Our mixed effects model consists of country‐varying coefficients, as well as ‘fixed’ (pooled) coefficients. This allows us to fully explore variation between countries. The model provides estimates for losses in total employment and women's employment, from which we infer income losses. We find that roughly half of estimated SADC countries have total employment losses below or approaching 25% of all jobs, while the other half have total losses exceeding 25%. Around one‐third of all jobs for women risk being lost during 2020 for Madagascar, Comoros, Angola, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. Our model implies that most SADC countries will experience an equivalent loss of wage income in excess of 10% of GDP (whether through pure job losses and/or reductions in wages and working hours). Policy implications are briefly discussed.

We assess the impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic on the labour markets and economies of 16 SADC member states using a qualitative risk assessment on the basis of high‐frequency Google Mobility data, monthly commodity price data, annual national accounts, and households survey labour market data. Our work highlights the ways in which these complementary datasets can be used by economists to conduct near real‐time macroeconomic surveillance work covering labour market responses to macroeconomic shocks, including for seemingly information scarce African economies. We find that Angola, South Africa and Zimbabwe are at greatest risk across several labour market dimensions from the COVID‐19 shock, followed by a second group of countries consisting of Comoros, DRC, Madagascar and Mauritius. Angola faces relatively less general employment risk than South Africa and Zimbabwe due to more muted decreases in mobility, though faces large pressure in its primary sector. These countries all face high risk in their youth populations, with Angola and Zimbabwe seeing high risks for women. South Africa faces more sector‐specific risks in their secondary and tertiary sectors, as does Mauritius. Comoros, DRC and Madagascar all face high risks of employment loss for women and youth, with Comoros and Mauritius facing severe general employment risks.