The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir after three decades of rule has brought to light a dynamic that has been present for years: an interweaving of political, economic and security issues between the states of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf monarchies. Since 2011, the most active powers are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which seek political support to counter both Iran's influence and the growing Turkish presence. The two Gulf monarchies' search for alignments with African counterparts has favoured the continuous reshuffling of alliances with direct effects on the local actors' strategic choices. These dynamics need to be considered to understand the determinants behind the currently increasing instability in the Red Sea area.

In 2015, the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi launched a new Italian agenda for Africa. Until then Italian involvement in African affairs had been almost exclusively restricted to multilateral initiatives. Through its new pro-active approach, Italy has engaged with the African countries through a dynamic and multi-layered partnership aimed at fostering peace, stability, economic growth and human development on the continent. Within this framework, Italy intended to go beyond the traditional 'donor-beneficiary' relationship to build a new partnership model centred around the concept of sharing. The article argues that the need to preserve or at least reinforce its international status as a middle-ranking power has been one of the factors that led Italy to relaunch its involvement in Africa. Nevertheless, statements of intent aside, Italian foreign policy is lagging behind other extra-regional players operating on the continent. Indeed, despite Italy's natural geographical projection towards the South, its many structural weaknesses and lack of a coherent foreign policy make it a declining middle-ranking power in the international arena, able to operate in Africa, even now, only within the framework of multilateral initiatives.

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