The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir after three decades of rule has brought to light a dynamic that has been present for years: an interweaving of political, economic and security issues between the states of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf monarchies. Since 2011, the most active powers are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which seek political support to counter both Iran's influence and the growing Turkish presence. The two Gulf monarchies' search for alignments with African counterparts has favoured the continuous reshuffling of alliances with direct effects on the local actors' strategic choices. These dynamics need to be considered to understand the determinants behind the currently increasing instability in the Red Sea area.

The Middle East and the Horn of Africa exist in two distinct regional security complexes (RSCs), groupings of states exhibiting intense security interdependence within a distinct region, but rarely between regions. Recent geopolitical changes and related analyses, however, point to either a subsuming or a joining of the two RSCs, potentially leading to a high degree of uncertainty in two conflict-prone regions. Given the importance of such developments, we question this theory of RSC expansion by offering a concise review of recent security interactions between the two RSCs as well as quantitatively and qualitatively measuring the material power capabilities of relevant states. Borrowing from and contributing to RSC theory, we also identify and analyse concepts and indicators such as threat perception and sub-regional alliances. Our findings demonstrate the Middle East RSC is not expanding to include that of the Horn of Africa. The two remain distinct and under internal consolidation, despite the current discourse. Rather, high polarity in the Middle East coupled with often-congruent interests in Horn of Africa states best explains the current pattern of their interaction, particularly as Middle East states pursue strategies that further their own security interests at the expense of rival states within their own RSC.

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Over the past fifteen years, Turkey has tried to achieve the status of global actor. Enhancing ties with the global South has been one policy to achieve this objective. The article aims to analyse the changing trajectory of Ankara's approach towards a non-traditional orientation of its foreign policy, the southern dimension, by focusing on the determinants of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) foreign policy in the last decade. The key argument is that the southern orientation of Turkish foreign policy has lost its constructive and developmental direction due to the complex interactions between the regional crisis in Turkey's neighborhood and domestic democratic backsliding, coupled with Erdogan's executive centralization, especially after the failed coup of 2016. As a major finding, the agenda securitization and the increased personalization of Turkey's domestic and international agenda have polluted an attractive foreign policy, even in non-priority regional areas.