The present research reveals that when it comes to recalling and imagining failure in one's life, changing how one looks at the event can change its impact on well-being; however, the nature of the effect depends on an aspect of one's self-concept, namely, self-esteem. Five studies measured or manipulated the visual perspective (internal first-person vs. external third-person) individuals used to mentally image recalled or imagined personal failures. It has been proposed that imagery perspective determines whether people's reactions to an event are shaped bottom-up by concrete features of the event (first-person) or top-down by their self-concept (third-person; L. K. Libby & R. P. Eibach, 2011b). Evidence suggests that differences in the self-concepts of individuals with low and high self-esteem (LSEs and HSEs) are responsible for self-esteem differences in reaction to failure, leading LSEs to have more negative thoughts and feelings about themselves (e.g., M. H. Kernis, J. Brockner, & B. S. Frankel, 1989). Thus, the authors predicted, and found, that low self-esteem was associated with greater overgeneralization--operationalized as negativity in accessible self-knowledge and feelings of shame--only when participants had pictured failure from the third-person perspective and not from the first-person. Further, picturing failure from the third-person, rather than first-person, perspective, increased shame and the negativity of accessible knowledge among LSEs, whereas it decreased shame among HSEs. Results help to distinguish between different theoretical accounts of how imagery perspective functions and have implications for the study of top-down and bottom-up influences on self-judgment and emotion, as well as for the role of perspective and abstraction in coping.

When mentally simulating life events, people may visualize them from either an actor's 1st-person or observer's 3rd-person visual perspective. Two experiments demonstrated that visual perspective differentially determines reliance on 2 distinct forms of self-knowledge: associative evaluations of the simulated environment and propositional self-beliefs about relevant values and preferences. Implicit measures indexed associative evaluations of environmental stimuli (political candidates, outgroups); explicit measures indexed propositional self-beliefs about relevant personal values or preferences. A separate session manipulated participants' visual perspective for mentally simulating a pertinent event (voting, interracial interaction) as they forecasted their behavior or feelings if that event occurred. Forecasts corresponded more closely with associative evaluations from the 1st-person than 3rd-person perspective but more closely with propositional self-beliefs from the 3rd-person than 1st-person. Results have practical implications for channeling the power of mental simulation to desired ends and theoretical implications for understanding the pathways by which imagery and mental simulation shape cognition.

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This research explores when and how tailoring messages to attitudinal bases backfires. Study 1 demonstrated that for attitudes (toward education subsidies) that were based more on beliefs than emotions, recipients whose initial attitudes were incongruent with the message position (i.e., message opponents) showed mismatching effects, such that the affective message was more persuasive than the cognitive message. Study 2 replicated these mismatching effects among message opponents for attitudes (toward a rival university) that were primarily affective. Study 3 controlled for effects of initial attitude certainty and replicated the mismatching effects of Study 2 for affective attitudes toward an increase in tuition. Finally, Study 4 suggested a potential mechanism for mismatching effects, revealing that for attitudes (toward an online course management system) that were based more on beliefs than emotions, message opponents counter‐argued with the cognitive appeal more intensely than the affective appeal. Contrary to the notion in the extant literature that mismatching effects are relatively rare compared with matching effects, the current research suggests that mismatching effects occur for both primarily affective and cognitive attitudes when the recipient is highly opposed to the message position. The present findings also demonstrate the utility of examining attitudinal bases at the object level in the context of message tailoring. Implications for message tailoring and for affective versus cognitive attitudes are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

After people make choices, they can frame the choice event in terms of what they chose, or in terms of what they did not choose. The current research proposes psychological distance as one factor influencing this framing and suggests implications. Three experiments manipulated dimensions of distance to demonstrate people's greater tendency to frame choice events in terms of chosen options at greater psychological distances. Additional findings demonstrate that these effects occur regardless of whether the decision turned out well or poorly. In a final experiment, framing a decision in terms of choosing (versus not choosing) a task made people more likely to believe their choice reflected their liking for the chosen task, which led to more favorable expectations for it. The discussion focuses on possible implications of these findings for understanding prior work on self-other differences in decision making, motivations for past decisions, reactions to decision outcomes, and counterfactual thinking.