The authors investigated the predictive utility of people's subjective assessments of whether their evaluations are affect- or cognition driven (i.e., meta-cognitive bases) as separate from whether people's attitudes are actually affect- or cognition based (i.e., structural bases). Study 1 demonstrated that meta-bases uniquely predict interest in affective versus cognitive information above and beyond structural bases and other related variables (i.e., need for cognition and need for affect). In Study 2, meta-bases were shown to account for unique variance in attitude change as a function of appeal type. Finally, Study 3 showed that as people became more deliberative in their judgments, meta-bases increased in predictive utility, and structural bases decreased in predictive utility. These findings support the existence of meta-bases of attitudes and demonstrate that meta-bases are distinguishable from structural bases in their predictive utility.

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We proposed that (a) processing interest for affective over cognitive information is captured by meta-bases (i.e., the extent to which people subjectively perceive themselves to rely on affect or cognition in their attitudes) and (b) processing efficiency for affective over cognitive information is captured by structural bases (i.e., the extent to which attitudes are more evaluatively congruent with affect or cognition). Because processing speed can disentangle interest from efficiency by being manifest as longer or shorter reading times, we hypothesized and found that more affective meta-bases predicted longer affective than cognitive reading time when processing efficiency was held constant (Study 1). In contrast, more affective structural bases predicted shorter affective than cognitive reading time when participants were constrained in their ability to allocate resources deliberatively (Study 2). When deliberation was neither encouraged nor constrained, effects for meta-bases and structural bases emerged (Study 3). Implications for affective-cognitive processing and other attitudes-relevant constructs are discussed.

The present research explores whether the type of relationship one holds with deceptive or honest actors influences cross-cultural differences in reward and punishment. Research suggests that Americans reward honest actors more than they punish deceptive perpetrators, whereas East Asians reward and punish equally (Wang & Leung, 2010). Our research suggests that the type of relationship with the actor matters for East Asians, but not for Americans. East Asians exhibit favoritism toward their friends by rewarding more than punishing them, but reward and punish equally when the actors are strangers (Experiment 1 and 2); Americans reward more than they punish regardless of the type of relationship (Experiment 2). Furthermore, the findings were replicated when the proposed mechanism -social mobility -was manipulated within the same culture (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how friends versus strangers are rewarded and punished in an increasingly relationally complex world.

Past Terror Management Theory (TMT) research has demonstrated that mortality salience leads to favoritism toward ingroup members and derogation of outgroup members and to polarized attitudes toward the source of pro and counterattitudinal statements. In such research, the individual's group membership and the individual's worldview position were examined separately. Thus, when the individual's group membership was manipulated, one could normally assume that an outgroup member is counterattitudinal and an ingroup member is proattitudinal. It is unclear, therefore, whether ingroup members elicited favoritism from mortality salient participants because of their group membership or because of their presumably proattitudinal position, or both. The authors present two studies in which the individual's group membership and attitudinal position are jointly manipulated. Results showed that among mortality salient participants, the outgroup member received favorable or unfavorable evaluations depending on his position, whereas the ingroup member received moderately positive evaluations regardless of the position taken.