Throughout the fifteenth-eighteenth centuries, the Crimean Khanate (supported by its close ally, if not suzerain, the Ottoman Empire) constituted one of the major powers of East European politics. The territory of the khanate comprised, in addition to the Crimean peninsula itself, the vast steppes north of the Black Sea, extending from Besarabia to the North Caucasus. In that, its location ensured the 'Ottomanness' of the Black Sea and, playing the role of an effective bulwark, blocked the southward drive of the Russian Empire. Therefore, not surprisingly, the expansionist schemes in the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, if not earlier, considered the obliteration of the Crimean Khanate and the acquisition of its territories indispensable. Such was the famous, or rather infamous, 'Greek Project' of Catherinian times which aimed at the establishment of Russian domination over the Black Sea and the foundation of a Russian-led 'Greek' empire centred in Constantinople. 1 Among other considerations, the Crimean peninsula was an ideal stepping stone for further expansionist designs involving the eventual conquest of Constantinople, or Tsargrad, as it was called by many Slavs. The obvious strategic, military and economic importance and potential of the Crimea, along with its exotic beauties, led many a tsarist statesman to dream of the Russification of the peninsula and its hinterland. Thus, when, after some 15 years of war and bloody unrest, the Russian Empire finally dissolved the Crimean Khanate and annexed its territories, resolute measures were taken by the tsarist government to this effect. From the very beginning of Russian rule in the Crimea in 1783, there was a determined effort on the part of the tsarist state to colonize the peninsula with Russian/Slavic (or at least Christian settlers), an enterprise during which the Crimean Tatars, the native people of the Crimea, were seen as superfluous, to say the least. The centuries-long political and military enmity between Russia and the Crimea was by no means forgotten. In fact, during the first 70 years of Russian rule in the Crimea preceding the Crimean War, at times, a considerable deal of oppression was meted out to the Crimean Tatars. The latter essentially became second class subjects in virtually all aspects of social and economic life in the peninsula. Therefore, the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783 signalled more than the loss of their age-old independence for the Crimean Tatars; it was also the beginning of a long and continuous process of their emigration to the Ottoman Empire, the land of their religious and ethnic kinsmen, in response to the tsarist policies and

were not confined to already dead bodies. Indeed, some people even killed others, especially children, to eat. 17 As thousands of starving and almost delirious peasants abandoned their homes in a desperate hunt for food, they often left their children behind, thus sealing their fate. 18 There were also cases of parents killing their own children to save them from a worse and slower death. 19 The collapse of the water supply, sewerage, and all sanitation systems signalled further disaster in the Volga basin. The neglected streets of Kazan, for instance, were covered with refuse and excrement; the cisterns, which formed the sewerage system, overflowed. 20 Not surprisingly, the famine was accompanied by widespread epidemics in the region, a fact which required medicine no less than food aid. Clothing was also urgently needed for thousands of people who were left almost naked. The ARA aid reached the Volga basin as early as September 1921 and the decision of the US Congress to offer $20 million for the victims of famine in Russia especially expanded its work. The ARA provided large amounts of foodstuffs, clothing, and medicine. By the end of January 1922, the ARA opened public kitchens in almost every starving place in the Volga basin. The amount of foodstuffs brought by the ARA to the region amounted to 5,213 loads (more than 80 million kilograms) by May 1922. 21 Despite its vital role, the ARA work in the Volga basin was, of course, not free of political impediment and suspicion. At one point, three Russian employees of the ARA in Tatarstan were arrested by the local authorities. They were freed only on the ARA's threat to stop food shipments. 22 The ARA also helped to link the Volga Tatar diaspora by appeals to help their brethren in their homelands. The Volga Tatars in Finland sent individual parcels of food to men of letters and religion in the Volga-Ural region. Apparently, the first consignment of such parcels was delivered to their addresses in early 1922 and the third delivery was received in early August 1922. 23 This timely help was deeply appreciated by the intellectual, literary, scholarly, and religious elite of the Volga-Ural Turks, most of whom were in a desperate situation. 24 The relief work of the ARA, Pomgol, Russian Red Cross, German Red Cross, Swedish United Committee, and many other domestic and foreign organizations was a help but could hardly defeat the catastrophe. There were also ominous signs and little hope for the following year. In addition to the fact that the lack of manpower allowed only a small part of the land to be sowed, most of that prospective harvest was burned by the drought during the summer of 1922 or destroyed by worms. 25 The way the Soviet government assessed and handled the crisis was hardly compatible with these developments.

"Çoban Geraylar" Kırım Hanlığı tarihinde tahta kadar yükselmiş bir soydur. Bununla birlikte, yaygın Kırım tarihçiliğinde, daha doğrusu "asıl" Geraylar'ın hiç değilse önemli bir kısmının rivayetinde "Çoban Geraylar"ın gayri-meşru bir kökene dayandığı ve Geray hânedânıyla kan bağının bulunmadığı tekrarlana gelmiştir. Ancak, bu klişe sorgulanmaya ve dönemin kaynakları yeniden tetkike muhtaçtır. Her şeyden önce söz konusu iddialar esasen buna ilişkin olaylardan bir asrı aşkın zaman sonraki dönemlerin tarihçilerine aitken, çağdaş kaynaklar bunları doğrulamamaktadır. Dahası, "Çoban Geraylar"ın mütekip devirlerde "asıl" yahut diğer Geraylarla esasen aynı imtiyaz ve unvanlara sahip oldukları görülmektedir.

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Abstract:Focusing on Cengiz Mehmed Geray, an idiosyncratic member of the ruling house of the Crimean Khanate, this article examines how a Crimean Prince became an active participant in the stormy politics of the Ottoman Empire and later of Europe, as a result of his distinguished Chinghisid pedigree, in the age of revolutions. The first section of this article discusses the place of the Geray and Chinghisid lineage within Ottoman imperial politics. The second section focuses on the period following the Gerays’ departure from Crimea. It illustrates how members of the family, although scattered throughout the Balkans, operated in the provincial and imperial politics of the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The following section introduces Cengiz Geray and his turbulent life between the Ottoman and Russian Empires, and discusses how he became an actor in a revolutionary age. The last section is a short discussion on Chinghisid charisma in the early modern Europe, Russia and the Ottoman Empire.