In January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new capital adequacy framework to respond to deficiencies in the 1988 Capital Accord on credit risk. The main elements or "pillars" of the proposal are capital requirements based on the internal risk-ratings of individual banks, expanded and active supervision, and information disclosure requirements to enhance market discipline. We discuss the incentive effects of the proposed regulation. In particular, we argue that it provides incentives for banks to develop new ways to evade the intended consequences of the proposed regulation. Supervision alone cannot prevent banks from "gaming and manipulation" of risk-weights based on internal ratings. Furthermore, the proposed third pillar to enhance market discipline o f banks' risk-taking is too weak to achieve its objective. Market discipline can be strengthened by a requirement that banks issue subordinated debt. We propose a first phase for introducing a requirement for large banks to issue subordinated debt as part of the capital requirement.

If the bank regulatory structure in developed countries, particularly those in the EU (as well as the US), were not changed, considerable private and social costs could be incurred. We first outline the current EU regulatory framework and describe and analyze recent bank crises and failures. Based on this record and on the (beneficial for consumers) changes in EU banking regulation, on new data on bank capital/asset ratios in ten European countries, and on an analysis of market and technological changes, we conclude that the present regulatory structure is unlikely to achieve banking stability in the future. We then propose and describe a regulatory framework that can deal effectively with this situation and show how it would affect EU banks.

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the interest rate sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest US bank holding companies. The main contribution of the paper is the use of survey data to model the unexpected interest rate variable, which is an alternative approach to the existing literature. We ®nd evidence of signi®cant negative interest rate sensitivity during the early 1980s, and evidence of declining signi®cance in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This result is also obtained when using the forecast errors of ARIMA processes to model the unexpected movement in the interest rate.

We attempt to translate Neo-Austrian ideas about the workings of financial markets, as originally advanced by F. A. Hayek, into the standard probabilistic language of modern finance. We focus on an apparent paradox, namely the insistence of Neo-Austrians on order~i.e., stationarity! together with ever-reemerging inefficiencies. The paper's findings have implications beyond Neo-Austrian theory: They demonstrate how easy it is to reject market efficiency, but how much more difficult it is to discern the nature of the inefficiency. We illustrate our findings with price data from the U.S. Treasury bill market over the period 1962 to 1999. There is ample evidence that the price of a three-month Treasury bill is not a random walk, yet the sign of the average price change is erratic, so that inference about the nature of the inefficiency is unreliable.

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