No abstract

R etailers are increasingly adopting a dual-format model. In addition to acting as traditional merchants (buying and reselling goods), these retailers provide a platform for third-party (3P) sellers to access and compete for the same customers. We investigate the strategic rationale for a retailer to introduce a 3P marketplace. Our analysis provides insights into the growing prevalence of 3P marketplaces. We show that by committing to having an active 3P marketplace, the retailer creates an "outside option" that improves its bargaining position in negotiations with the manufacturer. This can explain the increasing prevalence of such marketplaces. On the other hand, the manufacturer would prefer to eliminate the retailer's outside option and should seek to limit or prevent sales through 3P marketplaces. This is consistent with actions that several manufacturers have taken to limit such sales. Interestingly, if the manufacturer fails to eliminate sales of competing products through the 3P marketplace, then the best strategy for the manufacturer is to allow the retailer to dictate the terms of their contract. This is because a powerful retailer will rely less on its outside option in generating profit, and therefore it will increase the fees charged to 3P sellers and soften the competition between 3P sellers and the manufacturer. The decrease in competition will lead to an increase in the value of outside option of the manufacturer and improve its profit. Additionally, we find that the presence of a 3P marketplace benefits consumers, but this benefit diminishes as the retailer becomes more powerful.

In this paper, a risk-neutral manufacturer sells a single product to a risk-neutral retailer. The retailer chooses inventories ex ante and promotional effort ex post. If the wholesale price exceeds marginal production cost, the retailer orders fewer than the joint profit-maximizing inventories. If the manufacturer attempts to coordinate inventories by buying back unsold units, then the retailer's promotional incentives are dulled. Under very general assumptions on the form of the effort function, we show that buy-backs adversely affect supply chain profits, and higher buy-back prices imply lower profits. Also, while a buy-back alone cannot coordinate the channel, coupling buy-backs with promotional cost-sharing agreements (if effort cost is observable), offering unilateral markdown allowances ex post (if demand is observable but not verifiable), or placing additional constraints on the buy-back (if demand is observable and verifiable) does result in coordination. This problem is not limited to returns policies but is shown to hold for a much larger set of contracts. The results are quite robust (e.g., when the retailer chooses effort before observing demand), but coordinating contracts become more problematic if, for example, the retailer also stocks substitutes for the manufacturer's product. Other model extensions are also discussed.supply chain management, sales effort, promotional effort, supply contracts, incentives, channel coordination, inventory management, buyback, returns policies, cost sharing, markdown allowance

Productivity is a major indicator of company development. Various efforts are done by the company in order to improve the productivity of the company, one of which is the implementation of supply chain management. In its implementation, the management of supply chain management is implemented by the company as one of the strategies to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the resources owned by the company in order to produce maximum output, according to the company target. This article aims to conduct a theoretical study related to the role of supply chain management on increasing productivity. The research method used in this study is a survey in the article indexed Scopus. Furthermore, the data is processed by using discrete statistics grouped by time of publication, and the subject area and mapping of the best practice role of supply chain management on increasing productivity based on the Scopus indexed article. The results showed that there were 1036 Scopus indexed articles in the 1979-2017 (June) range. The role of productivity management in improving productivity is aped aspects: suppliers, reducing the disability that arises from the supply chain, the use of technology and some problems that often arise on the relationship between the supplier and the buyer.

Law, regulation, and private standards have evolved to enhance sustainability in value chains. However, the volume of hard and soft laws has created complexity and fragmentation for consumers and firms. In addition, global value chains are increasingly disaggregated, making it difficult for consumers to enforce breaches of sustainability representations. Blockchain, as an immutable and digital record keeping system, is a tool that can deal with this growing complexity in global value chains. Documents verifying sustainability that were once in the private domain and stored in paper copy can now be made accessible in a secure and transparent blockchain platform. Despite a growing interest in the potential of blockchain to transform businesses, there are few concrete examples or scholarly literature showing how blockchain is operationalized in practice. Using a “conceptual framework analysis” approach, we develop an Evidence, Verifiability, and Enforceability (EVE) framework to illustrate how blockchain can enhance sustainability by providing information to consumers on the origin of products, assurances as to the veracity of the information, and a mechanism to enforce representations through the blockchain smart contract function. However, there need to be safeguards put in place for blockchain technology to meet its promise and we discuss some of these challenges.