Parent-subsidiary relationships are commonplace nowadays, yet surprisingly there is a paucity of research analysing their dynamics over time. This paper presents a (longitudinal) case study, illuminating the dynamics implicated when a UK chemicals company imposed its systems and rules on a new subsidiary. Drawing on observations from a longitudinal case study (from 1993 to 2001), the study considers: (1) the extent to which a parent imposes its (management accounting) systems, rules and procedures on a subsidiary; (2) the role which (local) political, cultural and institutional factors in a subsidiary play in shaping the dynamics of such change implementation; (3) how new systems and practices become accepted and take root as values and beliefs and how they supplement earlier norms? The study provides insight for the questions above, and draws on institutional theories and a power mobilisation framework to assist in the interpretation of observations. We find that the operations of the subsidiary company are influenced by inter-related forces, both inside and outside the organisation encompassing issues of power, politics and culture. As such, existing institutions in a subsidiary organisation are influenced, sustained, and changed by the socio-economic context in which the subsidiary is located. Organisational practices designed to secure external legitimacy are not however always symbolic and decoupled from internal operations.

Institutional environment of a country plays an important role for innovation activities. Our results confirm that external environment of emerging countries influence the R&D investment. Using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of panel data for 664 firms from selected 20 emerging markets during the period of 2006-2013, we find that institutional quality has significant impact on R&D investment. The results show that government effectiveness, rule of law, and regularity quality have positive impact, while corruption and political instability have negative impact on R&D investment in the emerging markets. We also performed elasticity test to compare among the institutional factors. The results show that among the institutional determinants, corruption of a particular emerging country is found to be most important in influencing R&D investment followed by regularity quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, and political instability. These results would be helpful to investors and policy makers to assess the requirements of sustainable development. The results of this study clearly demonstrate that to attract more R&D investment as a source of sustainable development, government should ensure a sound and stable institutional environment along with strengthening other firm level factors as institutional factors are more important to explain the variation over the time and also cost effective in terms of implementation.

The relationship between R&D and firm performance is highly dependent on the external environment. Therefore, this paper examined the effects of country level investor protection (safeguards) and governance mechanisms (systems) on the relationship between R&D and firm performance. Using GMM estimation and elasticity testing of panel data for 423 firms from 12 emerging countries, we find that a country's safeguards tend to moderate the relationship between R&D and firm performance more than the system of a country. The results indicate that safeguarding is relatively more important for the relationship between R&D and firm performance than other country level governance mechanisms, as the former can easily attract outside capital when it is strong. These results have significant implications for innovation policy. In particular, managers may wish to strengthen investor protection to promote high R&D investment in order to increase firm performance.

Management accounting change and the changing roles of management accountants have dominated both the professional and academic accounting literature in recent years. This paper aims to contribute to these debates by providing evidence from a sample of management accountants working in both dependent (group) and independent (non-group) organizations in the U.K. One thousand (qualified) members of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA), U.K., were randomly selected from the association's database for a postal survey questionnaire. In all, 279 professionally qualified management accountants in both types of organizations responded to a postal survey questionnaire (58 percent from dependent and 42 percent from independent organizations respectively). A Mann-Whitney analysis of the responses indicates that while some significant differences exist between the views of the two groups, these management accountants agree on several of the management accounting practices and the roles of the management accountant investigated. The study provides further insight into MAS and the changing roles of management accountants. It was earlier hypothesized that significant differences would exist in the perceptions between the two groups. However the weak support for the hypotheses could be explained by the influence of other institutional forces apart from the head office control which is focused on in the paper. Thus, it was recognized that other institutional forces are likely to be at play in shaping the perceptions of the management accountants. This is a limitation of the paper and future research to study the impacts of other institutional factors is recommended.

No abstract