Many important resource allocation problems involve the combinatorial assignment of items, e.g., auctions or course allocation. Because the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items, preference elicitation is a key challenge in these domains. Recently, researchers have proposed ML-based mechanisms that outperform traditional mechanisms while reducing preference elicitation costs for agents. However, one major shortcoming of the ML algorithms that were used is their disregard of important prior knowledge about agents' preferences. To address this, we introduce monotone-value neural networks (MVNNs), which are designed to capture combinatorial valuations, while enforcing monotonicity and normality. On a technical level, we prove that our MVNNs are universal in the class of monotone and normalized value functions, and we provide a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) formulation to make solving MVNN-based winner determination problems (WDPs) practically feasible. We evaluate our MVNNs experimentally in spectrum auction domains. Our results show that MVNNs improve the prediction performance, they yield state-of-the-art allocative efficiency in the auction, and they also reduce the run-time of the WDPs. Our code is available on GitHub: https://github.com/marketdesignresearch/MVNN.

We introduce a new approach for capturing model uncertainty for neural networks (NNs) in regression, which we call Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty (NOMU). The main idea of NOMU is to design a network architecture consisting of two connected sub-networks, one for the model prediction and one for the model uncertainty, and to train it using a carefully designed loss function. With this design, NOMU can provide model uncertainty for any given (previously trained) NN by plugging it into the framework as the sub-network used for model prediction. NOMU is designed to yield uncertainty bounds (UBs) that satisfy four important desiderata regarding model uncertainty, which established methods often do not satisfy. Furthermore, our UBs are themselves representable as a single NN, which leads to computational cost advantages in applications such as Bayesian optimization. We evaluate NOMU experimentally in multiple settings. For regression, we show that NOMU performs as well as or better than established benchmarks. For Bayesian optimization, we show that NOMU outperforms all other benchmarks.

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We study the combinatorial assignment domain, which includes combinatorial auctions and course allocation. The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most important information from agents. However, the main shortcoming of this prior work is that it does not model a mechanism's uncertainty over values for not yet elicited bundles. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by presenting a Bayesian optimization-based combinatorial assignment (BOCA) mechanism. Our key technical contribution is to integrate a method for capturing model uncertainty into an iterative combinatorial auction mechanism. Concretely, we design a new method for estimating an upper uncertainty bound that can be used to define an acquisition function to determine the next query to the agents. This enables the mechanism to properly explore (and not just exploit) the bundle space during its preference elicitation phase. We run computational experiments in several spectrum auction domains to evaluate BOCA's performance. Our results show that BOCA achieves higher allocative efficiency than state-of-the-art approaches.

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