The trend to greater use of chemotherapy at the end of life could be explained by patients' and physicians' mutually reinforcing attitudes of "not giving up" and by physicians' broad interpretation of patients' quality of life, in which taking away patients' hope by withholding treatment is considered harmful. To rebalance the ratio of quantity of life to quality of life, input from other health professionals, notably nurses, may be necessary.

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Summary Imagine a Samaritan living kidney donor, who some time ago has anonymously donated one of his kidneys to a patient on top of the waiting list. He now contacts the transplantation centre once again, to donate part of his liver. The Centre, startled by this idea, refers him to the regular screening procedure for all Samaritan donations. It turns out that his wish is well‐informed, voluntarily made and that he is competent to decide. We acknowledge that a donor’s wish should not be followed in all cases, even though this wish is a clear expression of his own free will. However, a refusal must be based on sound moral reasons and it is less clear what reasons these might be. We outline the most common arguments for refusal, assess these arguments in terms of strengths and weaknesses, and show which arguments, if any at all, are most promising. We conclude, firstly, that we should only assess risks (which include motivations), not judge relationships, and secondly, that it is not a transplant centre’s mission to carry out a donor’s life project.

One of the requirements in the Dutch regulation for euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the doctor must be satisfied 'that the patient's suffering is unbearable, and that there is no prospect of improvement.' In the notorious Chabot case, a psychiatrist assisted a 50 year old woman in suicide, although she did not suffer from any somatic disease, nor strictly speaking from any psychiatric condition. In Seduced by Death, Herbert Hendin concluded that apparently the Dutch regulation now allows physicians to assist anyone in suicide simply because he or she is unhappy. In this paper, I reject Hendin's conclusion and in particular his description of Mrs Boomsma as someone who was 'simply unhappy.' After a detailed narration of her lifestory, I turn to the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt's account of volitional incapacity and love for a more accurate characterization of her suffering. Having been through what she had, she could only go on living as another person than the one she had been when she was a happy mother. That would have violated her integrity, and that she could not bring herself to do.