In this article, we demonstrate that through their use as tools of military containment, sanctions play an unappreciated role in international politics. We show that sanctions can be used to smooth shifts in relative power that would otherwise lead to preventive war. After presenting a model of shifting relative power and sanctions, we discuss two cases in which sanctions were imposed to destroy an adversary’s military capability. We also explore the implications of this argument for the evaluation of sanctions’ effectiveness. Because sanctions may be deployed as a mechanism to lock in the status quo rather than revise it, the outcome of a sanctions episode must be compared to its counterfactual rather than the status quo ante. Our argument suggests that sanctions may be effectively deployed in response to expected adverse shifts in relative power; therefore observed outcomes disadvantageous to the sanctioning state are insufficient proof that sanctions have failed.

Why are some locations more attractive targets for transnational terrorism than others? Remarkably little is known about the local-level conditions and attributes that determine precisely where transnational terror attacks occur within targeted countries. To date, quantitative terrorism research identifies country- or region-level correlates of terrorism, neglecting possible local factors. In this study, we posit five local-level factors that increase the likelihood of a terror attack: security of a target, accessibility, symbolism, material harm, and exclusion. Using a variety of estimation strategies, including multilevel, negative binomial, and propensity score matching models, we regress new sub-national geographically coded transnational terrorism data on various sub-national measures that might theoretically increase the likelihood of a terror attack. The results demonstrate that although country- and region-level factors matter, numerous local-level conditions, including where civil violence occurs, sub-national economic activity, and proximity to capitals and urban areas, are equally, if not more, important. The results help to substantiate the analytical benefits of adopting the sub-national level of analysis in the study of transnational terrorism.

This study analyzes in a longitudinal context the dimensional conceptualization of legitimacy set forth by Booth and Seligson in The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America, in which they found that legitimacy was composed of six different dimensions: regime institutions, regime principles, local government, political actors, political community, and regime performance. This study first tests whether the evaluation level of each dimension of legitimacy remains constant. The second part of this study tests whether the dimensional structure of legitimacy remains stable over time using 2004 and 2008 Costa Rica Survey data, identifying issues that researchers who conduct longitudinal studies under this dimensional framework should address in order to yield empirically valid results, and challenging assumptions made in recent longitudinal studies.

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In “Information and Institutions Revisited,” Fey et al. point out some corrections to the equilibrium analyzed in Chapman. In this brief response, we argue that while these corrections are appropriate, they do not address the larger substantive question of when conditions exist that would facilitate information transmission between an international security organization and a domestic audience. We show an equilibrium in which the core logic of the information transmission argument in Chapman remains. We also discuss the particular modeling choices that facilitate information transmission (or prevent it) in equilibrium.