Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Does corporate governance explain US bank performance during the period leading up to the financial crisis? We adopt the factor structure by Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) to measure multiple dimensions of corporate governance for 236 public commercial banks. Research Findings/Insights: Findings reveal corporate governance factors explain financial performance better than loan quality. We find strong support for a negative association between leverage and both financial performance and loan quality. CEO duality is negatively associated with financial performance. The extent of executive incentive pay is positively associated with financial performance but exhibits a negative association with loan quality in the long-run. We find a concave relationship between financial performance and both board size and average director age. We provide weak evidence of an association of anti-takeover devices, board meeting frequency, and affiliated nature of committees with financial performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We apply agency theory to the banking industry and expect that the governanceperformance linkage might differ due to the unique regulatory and business environment. Results extend Larcker et al. (2007), especially regarding the concave relationship between board size and performance, and the role of leverage. Given the lack of support for our agency theory predictions, we suggest that alternative theories are needed to understand the performance implications of corporate governance at banks. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We offer contributions to regulators, especially for ongoing financial reforms of capital requirements and executive compensation. Specifically, we show a consistent negative association between leverage and performance, which supports the current debate on Tier I capital limits for banks.

Using agency theory, we explore the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and bank risk. We employ panel data analysis to study the 97 largest European listed banks between 2006 and 2010, thereby covering the most recent international financial crisis. The results show that corporate governance mechanisms influence bank risk. During the financial crisis, different governance mechanisms can minimise or accentuate the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. In our model, bank size and G.D.P. per capita also exert a considerable influence.

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For improved corporate governance in this age of digitalization, the Board of Directors could investigate key operating performance indicators or KPIs for competitive advantages with Digitalization Dashboards. There are over 30 such digital metrics in the Digitalization Dashboard example in this paper. A starting point for developing such key metrics could be the digital values indicated by the “efficient stock market” with the market to book ratio calculation. The ten “new economy” companies had an average market to book ratio of 10.85 while the ten “old economy” companies had an average market to book ratio of 2.64. Why are sophisticated investors indicating that the equity market value or market capitalization of “new economy” companies is almost eleven times larger on average than their equity book value? Why is the average market to book ratio of “new economy” companies over four times larger than for “old economy” companies? What key digitalization metrics and competitive advantages are in play here? Digital dashboards are recommended here to answer such questions. While the awareness on boards regarding risks originating from disruptive innovation, cyber threats and privacy risks has been increasing, board members must equally be able to challenge executives and identify opportunities and threats for their companies. This shift for companies is not only about digital technology but also cultural. How can people be managed when digital, virtual ways of working are increasing? What do robotics and “big data” analysis mean for managing people? One way to accelerate the digital learning process has been advocated: the use of digital apprentices for boards. For example, Board Apprentice, a non-profit organization, has already placed digital apprentices on boards for a year-long period (which helps to educate both apprentices and boards) in five different countries.

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